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"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—St. Vincent of Lerins, *Commonit, c. 6.*

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INTELLECTUALISM IN PRACTICAL LIFE.

Whether or not we accept as adequate the time-honored definition of man as a "rational animal," that is, whether or not we admit that "rational" connotes sufficiently—at least in an implicit and fundamental way—all the essential characteristics that differentiate man from all other animals, it seems to become more and more widely recognized that "rational" expresses a distinctly and exclusively human prerogative. Not long ago there was a widespread tendency to interpret the behavior of animals after a human fashion, and to explain their activities by factors borrowed from the highest processes of human psychology—a sort of inverted anthromorphism, which, by the way, was used not unfrequently by those who, in another line of research, objected to the theistic position on the ground of its alleged anthropomorphism. These explanations started chiefly from the assumed necessity of showing that between man and animal the difference is one of degree only, not of kind, and that, since animals possess rudiments of the highest human faculties, the evolution of man from lower forms of life meets with no insuperable obstacle. But accurate experiments and scientific methods of investigation, free from *a priori* preoccupations, make it clearer and clearer that the mechanism of animal behavior, whatever be its nature, is not under the guidance of reason, and that, consequently, man alone is rational.

But it may be interesting to examine by reflection what actual

part reason plays in our ordinary life. By reason here is meant one of the functions of the intellect, that is, of the faculty of abstract, universal, and necessary knowledge, as opposed to the knowledge of concrete, individual, and contingent realities through the senses. Reason is the faculty by which one truth is logically inferred from other truths on which it depends; it is the faculty by which the logical links between various ideas are discovered and utilized. Its rules are the subject-matter of Logic, and hence the present paper might not improperly be entitled: Logic in Practical Life. It contains nothing new, and the excuse for publishing it is that we frequently lose sight of even the most obvious facts, especially when they refer to ourselves. Nor does it claim to be in any way complete and exhaustive; it only emphasizes certain facts and principles which must be kept in mind when studying concrete human psychology. The twofold aspect of practical life, namely belief and action, will be considered in order to see how far they depend on reason and obey the rules of logic. And we shall limit ourselves to ordinary, common, everyday life, leaving aside such activities as have for their exclusive purpose the search of truth.

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It might be suspected at the outset that a faculty which deals essentially with abstractions, with crystallized and dead formulas, will not always meet perfectly the exigencies of practical life, which consists essentially in the facing of concrete, complex, and ever changing situations, different from all other situations, by a concrete, complex, and ever changing individual, different from all other individuals. This, however, is what must be examined in the light of the facts.

That the mind is one is almost a psychological truism, yet it is not useless to insist on this principle, for it has been overlooked frequently, even by those who are fully aware of its theoretical truth, in the explanation of the actual working of the mind. The splitting of man, who is essentially one being, into several hypostasized faculties; the distinction of the faculties of knowledge from the faculties of feeling and action,

leading sometimes to the wrong supposition that they are independent of, and even antagonistic to, one another; the assumption that reason occupies a superior position as the absolute ruler and supreme judge of the other faculties, without being itself in any way subject to them—all this has been a frequent source of confusion and misunderstanding in psychological science. Analysis was a useful and necessary procedure, for our mind cannot understand at once the whole reality of so complex a being as man. But analysis has misled some to lose sight of the one central fact, that under these manifold manifestations man is one, and that sensation and reason, feeling and will, knowledge and action, science and practice, belong to the same undivided mind, and consequently work together. After analysing, one should not fail to reconstruct the real mind by synthesis, and should see that the process of distinction, good as it is as a method, cannot be transferred from the mental order of abstraction to the actual working of reality. One organ by itself, or even all the organs taken separately, are not the organism any more than a machine is the mere sum of its parts. The human mind is not an intelligence plus a will or plus an activity, but it is at once a feeling and willing and acting intelligence, or, if you prefer, an intelligent source of feeling and action. No mental faculty can be exercised normally without being influenced by all the others, and hence the act of intelligent cognition is ever under the influence of subjective dispositions as well as of objective evidence.

Besides the external reasons and motives which draw the mind to give or refuse its assent to a proposition, there is the all-important internal element which impels the mind to give or refuse such assent. While this is true to some extent of all assents, it is true especially of those that lead to practical consequences. In ordinary life, whether we will it or not, whether we know it or not, our beliefs are not guided by any pure reason or argument; they are sometimes not guided by reason at all. We find in the human mind a web of conventionalities, habits, dispositions, both innate and acquired, which the keenest analysis cannot disentangle. They may not be present in conscious-

ness, and often, notwithstanding all efforts to bring them to the surface, most of them remain hidden from the mind. They are active, nevertheless, and their influence is easily perceived in the analysis of our mode of action and behavior. Even if they primarily affect the feelings, will, or action, we know that "What ardently we wish we soon believe," and, to use Bacon's words, that "Men's thoughts are much according to their inclination; their discourse and speeches according to their learning and infused opinions; but their deeds are after as they have been accustomed." That man would be laboring under an illusion who would think that to him could never be applied the words of Henry IV: "Thy wish was father, Harry, to that thought." Who, knowing himself as he is and as others perhaps know him, can boast that he never saw things as he wished them to be?

The majority of our social, political, moral, religious, and other practical assents are based on merely implicit inferences which have their foundation partly perhaps in reason, but also to a great extent in affective and actual life. Reason may approve and ratify them later on, but they are accepted before being reasoned out. In mathematics permanent assents are obtained by exact demonstration, but this is never the case in the affairs of practical life. These have an importance for the whole man, not only for his reason, and the whole man must be convinced. Experience shows abundantly the truth of the saying:

> He that complies against his will
> Is of his own opinion still.

Does the candidate for election prove the justice of his cause by accurate logic? Which succeeds better, the orator who uses valid but cold arguments, or the one who, though perhaps lacking in logic, knows how to appeal to the feelings and prejudices of his hearers? In many cases, and with many people, if you do not want to settle a question, argue logically about it. A pure syllogism, however cogent, will not produce a permanent assent if the other faculties are not at one with the intellect. When a man cherishes some belief, syllogistic controversy is

not likely to convince him of anything except that he is right. When the mind is not prepared to receive a truth, the intellect, though convinced, is sure to retreat soon before the combined attacks of wish, will, inclination, and affections, except perhaps in extreme cases of almost exclusively intellectual types of mind, who disregard and disdain the contingent affairs of this world, and as a consequence prove themselves unfit for the practical things of life. In fact, the disposition to deal with abstractions is generally accompanied by the incapacity to meet the concrete demands of everyday affairs.

Frequently belief exists before the reasons to believe are known. We assent to the conclusion without passing through the premises, and it is only later that we discover reasons to justify our already existing belief—reasons whose value is estimated largely according to subjective dispositions. In many cases, reasons are used not so much to test and rectify existing beliefs as to give them that apparent justification and logical reasonableness which the mind requires. The first step is: this proposition is true; the second: how shall I prove it? And when we have proved a thing to our own satisfaction and to the satisfaction of sympathetic hearers we may be under the illusion that the thing is proved in itself, forgetting that we have seen through magnifying glasses reasons which others may examine through the reducing lenses of their different mental dispositions, and that we have overlooked or minimized the value of objections which others will thoroughly consider and perhaps exaggerate. In practical matters we think as we are, and we are what we are owing to manifold influences, and chiefly to mental surroundings, and to education begun in the family, continued in the school, and pursued throughout life. It is impossible to empty the mind of its previously acquired contents—contents not always acquired rationally—and it is just as impossible not to appreciate new truths according to these preconceived ideas.

A typical, even if extreme, instance of the manner in which many judgments are formed is found in the great English architect, Augustus Welby Pugin, the founder of the Gothic revival. I quote from Wilfrid Ward's *Life and Times of Cardinal Wise-*

man: "He [Pugin] visited 'Sant' Andrea delle Fratte,' the scene of the miraculous conversion of Abbé Ratisbonne, the Jew. Abbé Ratisbonne entered the church a Jew, and came out a Christian, having seen there, he stated, a vision of our Lady. 'The story,' Pugin said, after seeing the church, 'is demonstrably false. The man *could* not have said a prayer in such a hideous church. Our Lady *could* not have chosen such a church for a vision. The man could have had no piety in him to have stayed in such a church at all.' The friend to whom his remarks were addressed replied: 'As I heard the story, Ratisbonne was not at the moment praying, but thinking of the uncouthness of the architecture of the place.' Pugin's whole face changed: 'Is that so? Then he was a man of God. He knew what true Christianity was, though he was a Jew. I honour him. Our Lady would have come to him *anywhere.* The story is demonstrably true."

All men do the same in varying degrees. Theories are accepted, and then facts are found or selected in order to prove these theories, or at least to fit in with them. If such facts are not to be found, a little artificial modification of those at hand may adapt them sufficiently for the purpose. If finally this adaptation is impossible, well—so much the worse for the facts; they are partially discredited or entirely ignored. Facts have the reputation of being "stubborn things," yet, in some hands, and when used for certain purposes, they seem to become most docile and pliable. Again the influence even of words and formulas should not be overlooked. Hobbes has very aptly said that "Words are wise men's counters: they do but reckon by them; but they are the money of fools." And who can claim truthfully that he has never been a "fool" in this respect, and that he has never been deceived by words? Change the contents and leave the label, and all is well; but change the label without touching the contents, and a mental revolt followed by a vehement protest is the outcome.

Our sympathy or antipathy for men and things cannot fail to modify our views, and naturally our fundamental sympathy is for ourselves. We give others news, they give us gossip; we en-

tertain them, they bore us; we speak, they talk; we play the violin, they can fiddle a little; we are active, they are never at rest; we have some faults, they have some qualities; we are strict, they are harsh; we are indulgent, they are weak; and so on all along the line. This natural antagonism between the ego and other persons influences the views which we have of those who are or are not in sympathy with ourselves. Take two men who are as closely alike in character, qualities and defects, as possible. One is a friend of ours and happens to make a mistake. We think and say: Of course no man is perfect; it is impossible to avoid every fault; the best have some defects, etc. For the other we have no sympathy; on the contrary we regard him with almost positive dislike. He performs a noble deed, and we immediately say: No man is without some good features; even the worst at times do some good, etc. Both statements imply a mixture of good and bad characteristics, but the proportion of each varies considerably according to the expression used.

In general then we must admit that, while the influence of reason cannot be denied, and while some are by nature more intellectual and therefore more strictly logical than others, it remains true that other influences are constantly at work in shaping our assents and dissents, in determining what we shall hold true, and what false. Whatever it may be for epistemology or ontology, truth, for the psychology of practical life, is no absolute thing; it is relative to a number of circumstances, mental, physiological, and even physical, which by modifying the mind cannot fail to influence the judgment.

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Such being the case, how can we expect men to be consistent in their actions and behavior? A difference in practical knowledge will always make a difference in conduct. Practical active life consists in a series of reactions to concrete situations that confront an individual and require a special response on his part. As no two situations are perfectly identical in every respect, and as the human mind is being constantly modified in consequence of its accumulated experience, one may see at once

how great a diversity of responses is possible, not only in different individuals, but even in the same person at different times. To believe that activities can follow one another in perfectly logical sequence is to take a superficial view of men and things, and to mistake as identical realities which are in truth widely different.

It is impossible not to look at things from our own personal point of view. Subjective dispositions are varied and changing, and thus we become interested in different things. On the other hand, things themselves are very complex, and present many aspects any one of which may become interesting for a given onlooker. Hence it follows that responses to concrete environment are capable of infinite variations. True, there are rational principles to guide human action in all fields of business, morality, religion, etc. True, also, in the most important events we take time to deliberate, think, reflect on what is the best course to be followed. But here we are concerned with everyday actions, and not with the critical decisions that are taken in exceptional cases. We are guided by intellectual principles, we say, but are such principles in reality always used as guides and tests? Are they not sometimes rather used as proofs that our course of action was the right one? We act first, and then by the selecting of convenient principles, and the careful avoiding of inconvenient ones, we try to convince ourselves and others that the action was all that it should have been. Moreover, are such principles exclusively rational? Has their truth always been ascertained by the one who uses them? Are they not rather many a time framed for the need of the hour? Add to this that the application of such abstract principles may be made in a number of ways. To the solution of a practical problem not one only, but several principles may be applied according to the point of view from which things are considered. The principles of wisdom, duty, expediency, utility, pleasure, etc., may conflict with one another, and yet we have to choose one, and act accordingly. It is clear that reason alone does not determine which must prevail; the whole mental disposition also has its share in the decision.

Principles are subordinated in many ways, and it is not always an easy matter in a concrete case to establish the order of subordination or precedence. Even when we deliberate most earnestly in order to find the solution, the deliberation is guided not only by reason, but by habitual and transitory mental dispositions, endowed with a tendency to bring a certain principle to the surface and give it preference over the others. We are selective because we are not simply looking for the truth, or because the truth is such that we cannot look for it in a disinterested way. Because his object is the finding of truth, the scientist has to observe all cases with their circumstances. The chemist, for instance, cannot eliminate from his laboratory combinations that may be offensive to his sense of smell, nor can the historian overlook deeds of murder or rapine. In practical life, however, we do leave aside such facts or principles as would lead to unwelcome consequences.

What has just been said applies to actions that are under the immediate guidance of reflection. But these are few when compared to the number of actions that are not preceded by any thought or deliberation, either, as sometimes happens, because it is urgent to take a determination at once, to give an immediate answer, to adopt without delay a course of action, or, as is the case more frequently, because actions have become habitual and take place automatically. Here the influence of reason is considerably lessened.

The great majority of daily actions are performed through habit and routine. In the beginning they required a number of distinct efforts, but now the whole coördinated series unwinds itself uniformly and without attention. We may have a more or less distinct consciousness of such activities, but they proceed of themselves unless inhibited by a positive act of the will. The influence of reason on habitual actions is antecedent, not actual; remote, not immediate; that is, this influence is to be found at the start, before the action had become habitual, and it exists in the same proportion in which reason was instrumental in creating the mechanisms which now act automatically. What this

proportion is cannot be determined, for here again the complexity of the human mind, the influence of environment and of inherited and acquired dispositions, the fact that the acquisition of many habits begins even before the child possesses the use of reason, make it impossible to assign to every factor its relative importance. It is habit more than reason that produces uniformity of action, and is the greatest source of consistency in human life.

The dispositions and whims of the mind defy the most earnest attempt at analysis. An indigestion, a "blue" feeling, an illness, bad weather, and so on indefinitely, change, temporarily perhaps, but markedly, a man's disposition, and hence cannot but modify his various reactions to environment. It is largely because of this that in circumstances in which an individual would be expected to follow the same line of conduct, he will behave in a different manner. Perhaps he will reproach himself or be reproached by others for his inconsistency and lack of logic, consistency being looked upon as the standard to be reached. The different apprehension of the concrete situation, or the different application of the principles that govern it, which cause the apparent inconsistency in conduct, cannot be avoided entirely, since these causes are based on the nature itself of the human mind.

In practical matters the same proposition cannot have exactly the same meaning for all those who accept it, for it cannot be viewed from exactly the same angle, and with all the same implications. How could it have exactly the same meaning for those who accept it and for those who reject it? And how could there be any hope of escaping the diversity of subsequent action? Practical life in all its phases consists of concrete doings in response to concrete demands, hence it is not to be expected that it will always follow the abstract rules of logic.

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Complexity on the part of concrete reality which may be considered from an infinity of points of view; complexity on the part of the living mind which passes from process to process,

from disposition to disposition, and which is modified more or less deeply and permanently at every step: such are the reasons why it is not possible to reach perfect consistency in knowledge and action. The starting point varies with individuals; and, as even from the same starting point it is possible to have roads leading in every direction, so it is unreasonable to expect that all lives will have the same orientation, and, when they happen to have the same general orientation, that they will agree in all details. Many will start with different principles, and even where common principles are used, their interpretations and applications will be as many as the individuals who use them. The concrete facts of life are not always practically amenable to the precepts of pure reason, and the practical logic of one man cannot be estimated by the standard of another man's reasoning.

Undoubtedly we must strive to be logical, and teach others to be so; we must start from principles known to be certain, and carry them out as far and as faithfully as possible: this is the goal at which we should aim. The purpose of the present paper was not to discountenance this ideal, but only to indicate why it is not and cannot be realized in its fullness, and, by calling attention to the obstacles to be encountered, to make it easier to overcome them. But, even with the best intention and effort, there is no possibility of ever being perfectly consistent, for we cannot escape the influence of education, surroundings, and consequent prejudices. To live an exclusively rational life, were such a mental mutilation possible, would be to renounce some of the most important human faculties, and to maim our own nature. And since human nature essentially has other than rational faculties, to believe that the intellect can be isolated from these other faculties, so that it will not be permeated by their influence, shows a lack of knowledge of the actual working of the human mind.

As only those who are aware of the presence of disturbing influences can guard against them, it follows that such as plume themselves on their consistency and logic to the end are generally those who are less widely influenced by objective evidence, and more strongly swayed by subjective dispositions, whose

presence they do not even suspect. Man is rational, but reason applied to the facts of life has ways that are not always those of dead logic, and it shares in the protean diversity of the human mind and of external reality. Perhaps the fact that this is so is not to be deplored. Should every man become perfectly logical, this world would become monotonous, dull, and tedious, by losing the diversity of belief and action which, even if it is at times a source of painful experiences, constitutes nevertheless one of its most fascinating charms.

C. A. Dubray.

LUTHER IN THE LIGHT OF FACTS.

Out of the maze of legend and controversy that for almost four centuries has obscured a sane view of Luther, at last there begins to emerge a fairly correct portrait of this extraordinary historic personality. Luther's own contemporaries were amazingly ignorant of the character of the man whom, according to their religious pre-judgment, they either execrated or canonized. Needless to say that the succeeding religious differences still further prevented a fair account of him. But for the past fifteen or twenty years steady progress has been made toward an adequate biography. On the non-Catholic side appeared such valuable biographies as that by Köstlein, edited by Kawerau in 1903. On the Catholic side Janssen and Denifle have likewise accomplished wonders. The latest, which can be justly termed about the best single book on Luther, is that by Herman Grisar, S. J.—"Luther." English translation by E. M. Lamond, B. Herder, 1913—the two first volumes so far the only ones translated.

This book is not for the popular reader. But it should be read by anyone who wishes to at least get at a reasonable view of Luther. Its great merit lies in that it is documentary, making Luther as it were tell his own story by copious quotations from his voluminous writings. Add to this an eminent fairness of spirit and temperateness in style truly refreshing in a work dealing with such a delicate subject. All readers, Catholic as well as Protestant, will find after reading it that they must seriously reconstruct their views of this extraordinary personality. On the one hand, Catholics must abandon (if they had them) whatever beliefs they may have entertained as to any really serious moral shortcomings in Luther's character before his apostasy and marriage. He was evidently just about as morally clean as the average cleric of his day, though it is true that considerable talk went the rounds about his conduct with

Catherine von Bora previous to their marriage, also some severe criticism of his bibulous habits, and above all of his undeniably shocking coarseness in polemical writing. On the other hand, one can only look with a pitying smile upon those Protestants who will still strive to enshroud him with the halo of sainthood or of even, to modern standards, ordinary love of truth.

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The one great fact that stands out in sharp relief is that the genesis of Luther's apostacy had absolutely nothing to do with reform, a disgust with ecclesiastical abuses. All this came later, when Luther was older and became more and more confused in his own accounts of his youth. True, even in the beginning, he did scourge abuses just as did every Catholic preacher of the day, and as time went on more and more did he make use of these abuses to further his cause. But it is overwhelmingly evident from this biography that, abuses or no abuses, Luther by sheer mental development would have acted precisely as he did. Long before his attack on Indulgences or any other abuses, Luther had developed his heresy, his doctrine of justification by faith alone. From the earliest beginnings he seemed to have been simply beset with this idea. The explanation seems most likely to be along psychological lines. That is, he was steadily pushed to this view not by abuses he saw around him, about which at first he seemingly cared little, but by the peculiar bent of his nature. Naturally despondent, given to actual hallucinations of attacks by devils, oppressed by a horror of damnation, nervous and frequently broken in health, he seemed as if he had, for peace's sake, to discover some doctrine that would "assure" him of forgiveness and salvation. Hence, discarding all intermediaries, with true Teutonic roughness, he simply cast himself in despair upon the crucified Christ, and laid all his sins and burdens upon His atonement. Luther, therefore, was first and foremost and in the beginning a "heretic" and not a "reformer." In this he differed nothing from Arius, Nestorius, Pelagius and all the others. Note this, "Reform" was *not* in any sense of the term the motive force of Luther. It was the idea of "justification by faith alone." Let us remark also, in

passing, that the work was well under way long before the attack on indulgences by his theses nailed on the church door at Wittenberg. Aside from the fact that the nailing of theses was a customary academic act of those days, the act itself was not much more than an incident in the general drama. Only later on was it invested with the romance it now possesses in the imagination of his popular admirers.

Another broad fact stands out in this account. It is that Luther's insistence upon the Scriptures had not so much the end of placing them in the hands of the people, as is so commonly understood, as of making the Scriptures the sole rule of faith. It was not a question of actually possessing the Bible as of how to regard it. That ancient fable of Luther "discovering!" the Bible as a sort of long-forgotten dust-covered manuscript is too silly even to deny. Luther, as well as every other man of education of his day, was accustomed to the scriptures from his youth. By the very rule of his order he was obliged to study them diligently. Like thousands of others in any other schools, he was a regularly appointed professor of scripture. It was precisely this position as teacher of scripture in his monastery that gave the outlet to his peculiar views. Had the Bible been as unknown as the popular biography supposes, Luther might not have developed as he did along scriptural lines. Here again Luther's maturer memory played him tricks. He fell back for excuses upon the supposed lack of scriptures just as he did upon the presence of abuses, when, as a matter of fact, there is no evidence from his own earlier works to prove that these things exercised any material effect upon his early mental development.

Again, even the most pronounced Protestant must admit that, however great Luther may be as an historical personality, his actual mentality was certainly not extraordinary, and cannot be put in the same class with that of the previous great heretics, such as Nestorius, Arius, Photius or Pelagius, with all due respect to his ability as a translator and popular preacher. He simply had that one besetting notion of justification by faith alone and dinned it into people's heads until by sheer attrition it

wore its way in. Though clever enough in abuse and twisting of scriptural texts, his attempts to give a reasonable basis for his position were puerile. We see none of the keen analytical power or the metaphysical grasp of former great heretics: rather only the rushing, torrential power of Teutonism that by sheer bulk and noise won its way to the rabble, brutally thrusting aside reason, no less than tradition and custom.

From his own writings he shows himself woefully lacking in the equipment which his very character as a leader of thought demanded. On reading his polemical writings one is forced to either of the following conclusions: Either he deliberately falsified the teaching of the Fathers, the scholastics and the official utterances of the Church authorities, or else he was amazingly ignorant of them. Take Augustine, for instance, the one doctor to whose writings he most frequently appealed for support in his peculiar theory of grace. He audaciously tampered with the text of this great doctor in order to twist it to his meaning or else makes erroneous citations, so much so that even Luther's apologists and friends, such as Melanchthon, admit that he quoted Augustine when Augustine did not agree with him and that Augustine downright contradicted Luther on most vital points. (Grisar, Vol. I, p. 305-6). The great scholastics, notably St. Thomas, fared likewise. In 1519 Luther boasted, "No one shall teach me scholastic theology; I know it." Yet, if the reader will consult the pages of Grisar (Vol. I, pp. 133 *et seq.*) he will see for himself that Luther had only the merest superficial acquaintance with scholasticism and attributed to these "sow theologians," as he so coarsely termed them, opinions which were in reality the opposite of what they actually held. Later on, when the fight was at its thickest, he seemed to absolutely throw truth to the winds in his downright misrepresentations and distortions of both historical truth and Catholic doctrine (Grisar, Vol. II, pp. 392-3).

Now, how are we to account for this. That much was due to anger and some to a perverted belief in the axiom that the end justifies the means (which we will touch upon later) is evident. But to our present purpose it is sufficient to show that

Luther was woefully deficient in theological equipment. Nor is this surprising when we take into account the comparatively low standard of theological culture in his day. The golden age of scholasticism had set and been succeeded by a more or less bastard kind fairly well impregnated with verbose logic-chopping and Occamist errors. The course of training was itself hurried as well as superficial. Luther, for instance, after entering Tübingen in 1497 as a Master of Arts, commenced, October 29th, 1498, the Biblical course, and only two months later (Jan. 1499) began to deliver theological lectures on the Sentences. After six months he took his Doctorate in Divinity. Such was the theological training of Luther—not more than a fraction of that received now by the average theological student, let alone a D. D. (Grisar, Vol. I, p. 129). And yet this man set himself against all the theologians past, present and to come. The conviction is irresistibly forced upon us that Luther was not as a theologian more than superficially equipped to grapple with religious questions. Nor can it be said that later studies made up the deficiency. Because he was ever afterwards too busy for study. His labors as Prior in his order, his ceaseless output of polemical, devotional and scriptural works when the struggle commenced precluded serious study. True! his industry and capacity for work were herculean. But there was no time for reflection and no evidence of it. In the light of all this then it was nothing more or less than impudence on Luther's part to hurl the charge of ignorance against the "sow theologians," *i. e.*, St. Thomas above all, whom he hated with an almost personal hate. These men were infinitely his mental superiors. As for his apologists who caught up the cry and repeated it down the centuries to our own day, we can only hear them with a feeling mixed with pity and sadness at *their* ignorance.

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Luther, as the father of Protestantism, has been hailed by his admirers as the pioneer who blazed the way for modern progress; the hero who broke the religious, mental and political shackles forged by the Papacy for enslaved mankind; the cham-

pion of the rights of reason against an arrogant hierarchy; the liberator of the human intellect, and so forth. How much are these praises founded in cold fact?

Right in the beginning it can be stated, by way of general denial that the very cardinal principle of his religious system was debasing to humanity as such. That cardinal principle was the doctrine of the utter corruption of human nature due to original sin, and the consequent denial of free will. "Articulus omnium optimus et rerum nostrarum summa" in his own words. Along with these doctrines likewise went that other of Predestination. Man, according to him, was utterly incapable of doing good without supernatural grace: man has no freedom of choice even in the performance of works not connected with salvation. It is either God or the Devil that rules him. If God sees fit to damn him, then God forces him to do evil in spite of himself: he *must* sin. Earlier Protestant historians have sought to avoid this side of Luther's teaching, but later biographers now all sorrowfully admit it.

Now with such a dismal and low estimate of human nature can Luther be legitimately regarded as in any sense an apostle of humanity, of human liberty, of human dignity or inherent worth? Pushed to its logical conclusion such a doctrine would debase man below the most devil-ridden superstitious savage. What becomes of human dignity or intrinsic natural nobility and daring and Promethean struggle upwards, of human development and progress, of aspirations for liberty, for light, for anything that mankind has ever attained in his age-long painful struggle from barbarism to civilization, if he were as Luther would have him—a hopelessly corrupt being, devoid of spiritual liberty as a mere animal, utterly incapable of himself of doing good, the mere sport of either a devil that mocks him or of a God that damns him without mercy, a plaything in the hands of fate, an automaton? Such doctrine *ipso facto* kills every aspiration of humanity. It halts human progress more effectually than Confucianism. It would paralyze every noble aspiration and stop every wheel of progress. Is it not, therefore, more correct to say that humanity has progressed since Luther's day in *spite of Lutheranism?*

But more specifically as to Luther's claim to be an apostle of progress. Take for instance his views upon reason. The human will had, as we have seen, been utterly denied all power, practically annihilated. Human reason fared almost as bad. In fact, his contempt for human reason sprang from the difficulties involved in a denial of free will. For, if we deny free will, then so much seems contradictory and mysterious to our reason. Then so much the better Luther says. "Reason speaks nothing but madness and foolishness, especially concerning holy things" (Grisar, Vol. II, 279). In arguing for infant baptism against the Anabaptists he justifies it on the ground that after all reason is not essential to faith, in fact, is hostile to faith (373). Such being the case, in what possible sense can Luther be claimed as a friend of reason, as a worshipper at reason's shrine, as defender of the rights of reason, as the hero breaking reason's bonds and freeing it from ecclesiastical tyranny? In what sense can Lutheranism be termed "reasonable?" Verily if ever man preached contempt for reason, disregarded its inherent rights, lowered it in the esteem of mankind, that man was Martin Luther. If reason has since then developed and conquered so much of nature and become so supreme as it today, it has done so in spite of Luther's doctrine. His doctrine would logically put an end to all philosophy, to all science. Mental progress were impossible were his doctrine to prevail. Herbert Spencer would come in for his condemnation no less than did actually Aristotle.

To many this will seem quite strange in view of that other popular tradition that Lutheranism and Humanism were twin births or at least indissoluble friends. A passing word as to this. Now there were two and only two things in common between Luther and the Humanists at first: both favored the study of the classic languages, one for their classic beauty, the other as aids to the translation of the scriptures; both at first were critical of the existing ecclesiastical conditions, the one in a more or less spirit of satire, the other out of mortal hatred. There the friendliness ceased. As a matter of fact, they drew further and further away as time went on, until Humanism at last found its most

congenial and well-nigh only home precisely in those Catholic countries where it was first born. Erasmus, the greatest of all the Humanists, summed it all up in his own life. At first he played with Lutheranism out of mere hatred of scholasticism (such as he ignorantly fancied it), then he became its most formidable opponent and laments that "Wherever Lutheranism reigns there learning dies" (Grisar, Vol. II, p. 256). Luther, in like manner, welcomed at first Humanism as an ally, but later on vented his anger against it just as he had done against scholasticism (Vol. II, p. 398). The truth of the matter was that there was a chasm between the two. One was a glorification of humanity, the other a debasement of humanity. No wonder then that most of the Humanists forsook Lutheran lands to find shelter in lands faithful to Catholicity, which, whilst frowning upon the vagaries of Humanism, could nevertheless encourage its genuine love of culture. Then again Humanism, and that means the "culture" of all that and succeeding periods, lived on in spite of Luther and because of the protection of that very Catholicity which it had in its youthful excess turned away from for awhile, but not for long. Human reason in the long run found shelter in the old Church.

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We now come to perhaps the most formidable claim of Luther upon modern sympathy, namely, his influence as an apostle of freedom of conscience, political liberty (democracy) and separation of Church and State. As a premise to the following we say, like St. Thomas, "dicendum quod non." By no means. Hopeless partisan is he who can find in Luther's own writings as given profusely in the book before us any sympathy whatever on his part with any of these modern tenets, these bulwarks of modern civilization.

First as to freedom of conscience, religious liberty, toleration, etc. That these words were familiar enough on Luther's lips is true. But it was liberty and toleration for himself and his followers, none others. At Erfurt, Nurmberg, Wittenberg, wherever his party got the ascendant, it was invariable persecution and prohibition of both Catholic and dissident Protestants,

all defended by Luther. For an instance: He seeks to induce the Elector, his patron, to abolish all other faiths except his own at Attenberg, saying "Let there be but one doctrine in every place." This is only one of countless instances. He even advocated the infliction of the death penalty upon those differing from himself, justifying his attitude by quotations from the Old Testament. So he spoke regarding the Anabaptists (Grisar, Vol. II, p. 369). In fact, Luther's intolerance was so consistent that no serious historian would waste time in looking for aught to the contrary, in his writings. So then, how can Luther be called a friend of religious liberty, an apostle of freedom of conscience. No! It is childish to expect such modern views from a man of his age, above all from a man of his fiery temperament. Religious toleration came not until centuries after Luther, and then as a result of sheer weariness on the part of the conflicting religious parties. It was accepted as a practical *modus vivendi* necessitated by the impossibility of either conquering the other. Only in our time has this practical solution been elevated to the dignity of a theoretical principle. No one—Catholic or Protestant—believed in religious freedom or even toleration in that age of religious strife, and least of all Luther. Let that myth rest in peace.

If Luther, however intolerant, can be justified for his intolerance by the spirit of his age, it is harder to see in him a friend of the "people," a defender of popular civil liberty. For this let the reader turn to the account (p. 189-219) of the Peasant War of 1525, an affair which must forever remain as a black stain upon the pages of Luther's life. Until recently a quite lame attempt has been made by his biographers to absolve Luther's responsibility for this awful uprising on the ground of its having been a social affair. Now, however, they are being compelled to admit that even though social, it was fanned into flame and nourished by the preaching of the reformers, Luther directly. Germany then was in a fever of social discontent with the masses arrayed against the princes. Luther's preaching of religious freedom from the ancient spiritual control fell like matches upon powder upon the ears of the discontented. As a

result a perfect war of anarchy burst forth in 1525, which for a time threw parts of Germany into social chaos, until the uprising was put down in most merciless and bloody fashion. Now, how did Luther conduct himself? Whilst at first posing as the friend of the oppressed and boldly upbraiding the Princes for their oppressions, all the time fanning the people into rebellion with his fiery addresses, no sooner did he see that success was to rest with the Princes, but he turns over to their party and leaves the poor peasant to the mercy of their conquerors, whom he urges on to what would now be called fiendish cruelty. "Pure deviltry," he says, "is urging on the peasants"; they "rob and rage and behave like mad dogs. Therefore, let all, who are able, hew them down, slaughter and stab them, openly or in secret, and remember that there is nothing more poisonous, noxious and utterly devilish than a rebel. You must kill him as you would a mad dog. * * * Let whoever is able help in the slaughter," and so on. Such was the short shrift Luther accorded the very men who were only following out his own preaching. It is a pretty foul blot on his character.

Nor can it be urged in reply that Luther was not here enunciating his general views on the relations between authorities and subjects, because these above words fall in only too aptly with what he wrote on other occasions when he was speaking in general. Listen to the following from this heralded prophet of democracy. In one of his sermons printed in 1526, he says:

"Because God has given a law and knows that no one keeps it, He has appointed lictors, drivers and overseers, for Scripture speaks thus of authorities in a Parable: Like the donkey-drivers who have to lie on the necks of their beasts and whip them to make them go. In the same way the authorities must drive, beat and slay the people, Messrs. Omnes, hang, burn, behead and break them on the wheel, that they may be kept in awe. * * * As the swine and wild beasts have to be driven and constrained by force, so the authorities must insist upon keeping of the laws." Luther even goes so far as to assert that the best thing that could come about would be the revival of serfdom and slavery. Later on he depicted the peasants as follows: "A

peasant is a hog, for when a hog is slaughtered it is dead, and in the same way the peasant does not think about the next life, for otherwise he would behave quite differently. * * * The peasant remains a boor, do what you will; they have their mouth, nose, eyes and everything else in the wrong place. I believe that the devil does not mind the peasants." * * * "He despises then as he does leaden pennies: he easily manages to secure them for himself, as they will be claimed by no one else." "A peasant who is a Christian is like a wooden poker," and so forth. Truly this is a long call from the Declaration of Independence and Rousseau and the Bill of Rights. It is hard indeed to see in the heart of the author of such contemptuous references to the "people" the slightest intimation of any sentiment approaching democracy or even ordinary civil liberty. Such words could come only from a firm believer in class rule and the most undisguised monarchical tyranny. It, therefore, passes the imagination and the most kindly spirit of criticism to see in Luther any sympathy whatever for democratic institutions, for civil freedom, any love for the masses or the "people" (Grisar, Vol. II, pp. 217-218).

And this brings us to a consideration of Luther's opinions concerning the relations between Church and State. For this the historian must consult his acts rather than his words. His utterances on that all-important subject are too confused and contradictory to admit of any definite conclusion. According to the variation of circumstances he expressed varying opinions. No central principles seemed to have guided him (Grisar, Vol. II, p. 312). But when we come to his actions, then we do find an unvarying consistency in advocating the duty and right of the authorities to regulate religious observance in their domains, with the equally unvarying proviso that they establish Lutheranism. Wherever the new opinions flourished, it did so always with connivance or open protection of the civil authorities, who were only too willing to assist in view of the material advantages to them resulting from the exploitation of church property. This is, of course, merely elementary history. In his "Erastianism" Luther was, of course, not ahead of his age. Separation of

Church and State was unthought of and, with the exception of a few idealists like Thomas More, unthinkable in those days. Protestant and Catholic alike believed uniformly in a close alliance.

It is, therefore, quite silly and childish for a modern admirer of Luther to seek to see in him any thing whatsoever that could make of him a fore-runner of our so widely accepted theory of separation between the civil and religious powers. Such a view is not history: it is imagination impinged back upon a past age utterly different in temper from our own. One could as well see in Luther's Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans a foreshadowing of the latest advance in surgery.

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There are one or two other aside considerations which deserve attention before closing this survey of Luther's character, since they throw light upon some stock-in-trade charges against the church of his day.

First, concerning that ancient calumny directed chiefly against the Jesuits, that a pretty general principle of theirs was that " the end justifies the means."

Now, even a superficial knowledge of that most unlovable period of history is enough to show that it was, comparatively, a rather unscrupulous one, which did not hesitate to stoop to some rather shady means to attain its ends. We know of no period of history which seems so essentially dishonest and cynical as that extending, roughly speaking, all through the three centuries following upon Luther's appearance. The politics of that time are a maze of deceit, wherein Elizabeth, Frederick, Philip, Richelieu, Peter the Great, Henry VIII, all played about as dirty, shameless, cynical game as ever disgraced human annals. For our separated brethren then to attempt to fix all the odium upon Catholics of the time is about equal to the pot calling the kettle black, leaving aside the utterly unproved and unprovable slander that Jesuits or any other Catholics ever held to such an infamous principle as the one in question.

Here again Luther was not ahead of his age. Whether from eagerness or forgetfulness of a high honor in the heat of the

struggle or from fear or from constitutional obliqueness of character or from a mixture of all, Luther did most undeniably make use of means to attain his ends which would now be considered by all right-minded persons as absolutely dishonest. He deliberately misled the people in introducing his teachings and did so knowingly and professedly. For, in order that his teachings might the better make progress, he advised his preachers to go slowly, *i. e.,* to retain most of the old Catholic customs to which the people were attached, and a sudden removal of which might anger them; in a word, to deceive the people into gradually becoming Lutherans whilst still thinking themselves true to the old Church.

"Thank God, in indifferent matters our churches are so arranged that a layman, whether Italian or Spaniard, unable to understand our preaching, seeing our Mass, choir, organ, bells, chantries, etc., would surely say that it was a regular papist church and that there was no difference or very little between it and his own" (Grisar, Vol. II, p. 322). For this reason also he retained in some places Communion in one kind, and that not of the chalice; also vestments, lights, etc. And all this done for the expressed and admitted purpose of fooling the people. Nor was this done as a mere exception. It was a settled policy wherever the change could not be made more rudely. Strange, too, for a man like Luther to advise people (as he did a young student) to attend that very Mass for which he said he had such a horror that he had sinned more when saying Mass in his earlier days than if he had "been a highwayman or had kept a brothel" (*Ib.* 323). With all this falls in Luther's brazen defense of lying apropos of his permitting Philip of Hesse to take a second wife, the first being still alive. He says, "What harm would there be, if a man, to accomplish better things and for the sake of the Christian Church, does tell a good, thumping lie?" Again, "We are convinced that the Papacy is the seat of the real and actual Antichrist, and believe that against its deceit and iniquity everything is permitted for the salvation of souls" (Catholic Encyclopedia, p. 456: Vol. IX).

Surely with these incontestable facts before their eyes Luth-

er's modern admirers would do well to be silent about "the end justifying the means." For in Luther's own words and acts and in those of his followers acting under his advice we find accepted as a settled and praiseworthy policy this, namely, to tolerate for the time being, in order to better deceive the people, Catholic practices which Luther regarded as abominations and blasphemies. If this is not justifying lying and deceit for a good end, then words mean nothing.

An allied and more serious question remains also to be dealt with, namely, how did Luther look upon assassination and the use of torture as means to the attainment of his ends? It would not be broached here at all except for the fact that these charges have been so widely levelled at Luther's Catholic contemporaries. So that even to this late day the mass of Protestants seem fairly well imbued with the conviction that assassination and torture were an exclusive prerogative of Luther's enemies.

Here, also, as everywhere when treating of Luther, it is only fair to Luther himself to be mindful of the character of the times wherein he lived. And Luther's times were surely bloody. Human life was cheap indeed then, and for a long time to come, when a Tudor king could snuff the life out of his queens without a very great shock to public opinion and when the awful Thirty Years War made of prosperous Germany one huge sepulchre. Men in those days hated to the death. There was none of that sentimental pity for the criminal characteristic of our times. They played high, and woe to the unlucky loser. So it came about that torture was an established method of criminal procedure, whether under an Elizabeth or Torquemada, and that human life was only too often taken by the shorter method of assassination.

No one, then, need be surprised to find that many of both sides shaved pretty close to advocating the latter. Even as comparatively gentle a man as Melanchthon said that it was lawful to put a tyrant to death, and went so far as to express the hope that a man be found brave enough to kill Henry VIII of England. (*Catholic Church and Christian State.* Hergenröther, Essay XIV, 9.) To look for milder sentiments in a

man of Luther's ardent temperament is, of course, futile. We find him fully abreast of his times in the matter. Let the reader turn again to the history of the ill-fated peasant uprising, which must ever remain such a dark stain upon his career. After the leader, the prophet Munzer, had been defeated at the battle of Frankenhausen in 1525 and been tortured before execution, both Luther and Melanchthon expressed their opinion that his torture should have been more severe (Grisar, Vol. II, p. 203). No more mercy did Luther show for Munzer's deluded followers, upon whom he invoked the most cruel measures from the hands of the victorious Princes, urging everybody to "hew them down, slaughter and stab them, openly or *in secret.*" (*Ib.* 201.) The italics are our own. Mind that, "*every one,*" who can, is thus urged to kill, and do it *in secret* as well as openly. Could a more explicit approval or a more open invitation to assassination be found? If a monarch like Philip II, putting the public ban upon a Protestant, acting in his capacity as sovereign punishing a criminal, be held accountable for murder, how much so should public opinion condemn Luther, who, though a private individual and a minister of God, took upon himself to advise "every one" to murder *in secret* those wretched peasants, who, after all, were only following out to the letter his own inflammatory denunciations of public authorities. His counsel was plainly and indefensibly a counsel of assassination. His admirers would, therefore, do well to go a bit slow in striving to fasten the odium of that detestable crime exclusively upon some Catholic rulers. It is, of course, evident that Luther was here merely reflecting the brutality of his age. Not even his bitterest opponent should accuse him or any of his Catholic contemporaries of holding to a theoretical belief in the right of assassination. The point, however, is that his Catholic contemporaries have the right to be judged by the same standard of practical morality of the day as by which Luther should be judged. He was no better and no worse. Only, we may add with surprise, that as a "reformer," better things, a higher standard, is expected of him, all the more so considering his character as a minister of the Gospel.

Speaking of the brutality of his age, so also as to its coarseness of speech, Luther was typical. His language in religious controversy was nothing less than foul, at times almost obscene. Catholicism to him was spiritual "harlotry," the scholastics were "sows," and so on up and down the gamut of the coarsest invectives. Here, too, whilst admitting that he was only exemplifying in an extreme form the billingsgate method of controversy characteristic of his times, might we not expect better things from a "reformer," more charity from a spiritual leader, more self-respect from a leader of the world's thought, more decency from the founder of a great religious movement, more tolerance from an apostle of religious freedom, more self-restraint and gentlemanliness from one who firmly believed himself inspired by God! May one not be pardoned a doubt whether God prefers his gospel to be preached with the slang and cursing and foul speech of the fish-market!

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As we lay down this life of Luther the question remains to be answered, perhaps will always remain not entirely answered, at least for an indefinite period of time: "How is it that Luther succeeded?"

To the present writer the whole movement loses, upon closer scrutiny, more and more of the character of a spiritual movement. Luther, of course, regarded it as such, and his conviction of the righteousness of his course may well be granted despite his unscrupulous use of unjustifiable means to advance the same, such as his unvarying subservience to secular authority, his vileness in invective, his advocacy of lying, his constant misrepresentations of his opponents' words and acts, his own frequent fits of despondency at the sight of the ruin wrought by him, his revolting coarseness and obscenity in speech. For, from first to last, he was possessed, obsessed by the idea of "Justification by faith," the only mark of consistency in him. That notion started him and directed him and stayed with him until death. And it was a theological notion.

But more and more does the theological aspect of the movement seem to be giving away before its political and social

aspects. Granting the theological ferment caused by Luther's teachings, the movement as a movement seems to have been dominated by non-theological forces. As a spiritual "reform" it cannot any longer be considered seriously. Luther's mental development, as we have seen, started independently of any idea of reform and long before he took up reform as a pretext. His subsequent writings and acts were dominated not by the notion of a moral reform but by a fanatic desire to utterly change the whole doctrinal character of Christianity. Neither did the movement result in any reform, a fact which weighed heavily upon Luther in the last unhappy years of his life. There is about the whole sad history absolutely nothing of that zeal for personal purity, that sweetness of manner, that calm study of moral conditions, that mystic beauty, that go with a great spiritual work. Instead, it is all war, cursing, vile imprecations, bloodshed, theological hatred, looseness of morals, lying, selfish aggrandizement, pillage of property, fanaticism, appeals to mob-passion, mercenary exploitation of church property by secular authority, substitution of personal abuse for sane debate, contempt for the very rights of reason—a veritable bedlam wherein Luther and his opponents mutually call one another insane, as many of them apparently were. In it every evil force in human nature seems to have been let loose, everything of spiritual delicacy shattered by contact with the volcanic, elemental passions of humanity. Call it, if you will, my Catholic prejudice. But I cannot see in this the work of God, a work of reform, a work of reconstruction. I can see in it only ruthless destruction. To say that good came out of it can be, for the sake of argument, granted without any withdrawal of this statement. Good also came out of the barbarian invasions that destroyed Roman civilization. Moreover, what good has come, came in spite of Luther, for the modern world does not now live up to a single one fundamental position taken by Luther, except his hatred of the Papacy. Were he alive now, he would not recognize a true follower in any modern man.

The real causes of Luther's success lay deeper than himself, and were altogether untheological. They seem to be ever more

and more political and social and racial. True! there was a world-wide demand for spiritual reform; true, also, this demand came as a potent ally to Luther after he commenced his work. However, there had been equally great demands for reform in previous centuries. The cry was raised by Bernard in the twelfth century no less potently than by Luther in the sixteenth. But what was that particular thing that gave it its fearfully destructive character in Luther's day?

The answer lies somewhere in a study of general world conditions. Far-fetched as it may seem at first sight, I would say that in mankind at large as a unit, just as in every particular man, there comes a time when it simply gets tired of monotony and longs for a change. Man is not stable. He gets tired of certain foods and pleasures and occupations, and changes them. The world in A. D. 1500 was thus tired. It had lived under Medievalism too long, for Medievalism had accomplished its mission of reconstructing society out of the shattered remnants of classic civilization and raw barbarian materials. Its ideals and its ideas and its grandeur were on the wane. The old ideal of a theory of the world-wide Christian Church and State, with the two heads, Pope and Emperor, was giving way before the rising national consciousness of its different political entities. Each nation was more and more assuming in its own borders political powers hitherto more or less submerged in the Pope and Emperor. With it grows an ever-increasing irritation at "foreign" interference. So that here, at the very outset, we understand in a flash how it was that the reform became such a political tool; how it was that it never could have succeeded as an ostensibly religious movement except for the support of the civil authorities; how it is that to this very day the most murderous and the most general argument against Rome on the part of Protestants is precisely its non-national character, the branding of Catholics as foreigners.

Add to this the general realignment of social forces then going on. The passing of the old guild system was revolutionizing the entire industrial world, leaving the poor at the mercy of an unscrupulous aristocracy. The extension of commerce

by the new geographical discoveries was making the old ways of doing business inadequate and out of date. With the gradual diminution of Papal political power the kings were more and more absorbing all political power into an absolute monarchy. Then, too, the age-long dislike of "Italian" interference. Three centuries before Luther was calling his "dear German people" to arms against Roman supremacy, St. Thomas A' Becket and Bishop Grosseteste in England were fiercely denouncing what they thought to be Roman incroachment upon English liberties in language as forcible, but not so coarse.

And so on. Everywhere, in all departments of life, we find a drifting away from old moorings. The change was inevitable: the revolution was not to be stopped. It is heard distinctly muttering from the lips of Savonarola long before Luther thunders it at Augsburg and Spiers. The seeds of the whirlwind are sown at Avignon long before it becomes the rugged tree at Wittenberg. The politics of Philip II, Francis I, Henry VIII, the German Protestant Princes, are as much its fruit as is Luther's commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, more so in fact. The entrance of England as a nation under Wolsey's guidance into continental politics for the first time, the dismemberment and ruin of Germany in the Thirty Years War, the rapid but short-lived supremacy of the Spanish Empire, the slower but more enduring supremacy of the French monarchy, the intricacies of Richelieu's heartless diplomacy, are part and parcel of a whole world-wide upheaval in which the doctrine of justification by faith plays an insignificant rôle. In a word, all human society was changing from bottom to top. There was a sort of irresistible general spirit of uneasiness in the air. No man could have stopped it. No one man could have hindered it.

Luther's rôle was to suddenly crystallize all these hitherto loose elements of disruption. In this sense he was a leader, not because of his peculiar theological views, which were, after all, not original nor are today accepted, but because of his utterly revolutionary character and methods. This brutal brushing

aside of tradition, the Fathers, Councils, Popes; his almost anarchical onslaught upon the very idea of religious authority made him the very incarnation of this spirit of revolt from the past which is the keynote of that period. He was, indeed, the petrel flying on the crest of that awful storm in human affairs. This is the test of the extent and the nature of his distinction and his claim to greatness.

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We will not quibble over the meaning of the word "great." But we will only ask if Luther was a benefactor of the human race. Let his admirers, who, will, of course, answer "yes," however, reflect. That a change in human relations was inevitable in Luther's age is evident. But was the manner of that change beneficial? Is it good for any single man or humanity at large to brutally cast aside the past, all the sweetness, the tender traditions and loves that must cling to it? Can he do so without injuring his character? Does nature go by leaps? Rather, does it not develop? Is it not wise to preserve what was good in previous civilizations? Does not the world learn slowly and painfully, and cannot, therefore, afford to carelessly toss aside all its previous culture?

Yet were not these very mistakes made by Luther and his contemporaries? Did they not with one wave of the hand brusquely sweep aside all the wearily won progress of the Middle Ages—the development of some eleven centuries? Would it not, then, have been better for the human race had it rather gone forward more discreetly and preserved what was good in Medievalism and builded upon the sturdy foundations laid for them? What a magnificent edifice we moderns could have built had we done so. This is the burden of the charge which future historians will ever lay against such as Luther and Erasmus, that they *destroyed* for centuries so much that was of real value to the human race and just so much put back the human race in its progress. They destroyed as much as Attila and Genseric, even if they did it by satire and coarse abuse, and not by fire and sword. Today we are recognizing this awful mistake. The scholarly world is again turning back to the Middle Ages, delving in every corner of Europe for

precious information about those very ages, which, owing to the brutal ignorance of the sixteenth century, were allowed to be forgotten. We are striving to *undo* the work of the Reformers and the Humanists, striving to get back the civilization which they thought they had condemned to oblivion. No more significant condemnation could there be of Luther's work on the part of the thinking men of today than precisely this feverish interest in Medieval culture. It is a recognition by men of thought that the Reformation was a *mistake* in the history of culture, a retrogression in the mental development of mankind in the sense of it being a distinct *loss* of something inherently good. Every pretty life of Francis of Assisi or original quaint angel of Fra Angelico or curio in carving of a Medieval silversmith, every edition of a forgotten Medieval writer by the Rolls Series or of some university's cartulary or gild's regulations or town-charter, every one of these acts constitutes on the part of us moderns a protest against the revolution of which Luther was the main personality. All of us, even Luther's own admirers and religious followers, thus unconsciously condemn his work as a work of destruction and logically refuse to him the claim of being a benefactor of the human race.

Let this be sufficient for present reflection. It is significant enough. One could, it is true, point out how Luther's labors have resulted in hopelessly dividing the Church of Christ and making of it a laughing-stock to the heathen, of making so many millions of human beings, in consequence, religious indifferentists; of taking away from the very Bible all mark of authority; of having drenched Europe with blood and placed a feeling of ineradicable hatred in the hearts of Christians today; but all that will, of course, be misconstrued as controversy. We are content for the present estimate of Luther's benefactions to humanity to state, as above, that the entire world of thought is endeavoring now to *undo his work* by rescuing from the oblivion cast upon them by him those very same Middle Ages whose Catholicity he hated with undying hate. His own namesakes today are thus unconsciously condemning his work as a mistake, a halt in human development, a loss to mental culture, an injury and not a benefaction to the race.

It is with genuine regret that we say this of Luther. His was a rare chance, seldom given in history, to perform a work for humanity equal to that given to any man. In some ways he had the power to do a great work—his enthusiasm, his capacity for work, his boldness, could have, if rightly directed, resulted in causing a real reformation without the awful destruction that he did cause. As it is, he failed signally. Both the Church at large and humanity as well lost when he blundered.

And it is with equally genuine pity for him that we close this study of his life. Stormy petrel that he was, he found little peace of mind in those turbulent times. And when the evening shadows were closing round him his heart grew heavier. Dyspepsia, nervous headaches, chronic granular disease, gout, sciatica, abscesses, vertigo and gallstone colic ravaged a body already worn out by excessive work and the excitement of a life ever of warfare. One by one his comrades at arms deserted him, either through difference of opinion (which Luther never could forgive) or through sheer inability to put up with his ever-increasing irritability. His memory then plays tricks upon him, giving rise to the legends and exaggerations which have for three centuries so distorted his biography. His heart grew sadder and sadder at the sight of the barren results of his work. His last sermon at Wittenberg (Jan. 17th, 1546) voices his despondency: "Usury, drunkenness, adultery, murder, assassination, all these can be noticed, and the world understands them to be sins, but the devil's bride, reason, that pert prostitute struts in and will be clever and means what she says, that it is the Holy Ghost." *Cath Encyclop., Ib.*) And that very same day he pens the pathetic lines: "I am old, decrepit, indolent, weary, cold, and now have the sight of but one eye." And yet, amidst all this, in the very shadow of death, he rouses himself to the composition of his coarsest and bitterest pamphlets against the Jews and the arch-enemy, the Pope.

Thus he died unforgiving, with his heart full of hatred, leaving to his spiritual children a legacy of hate for their Catholic fellow-humans, the persistence of which even into this enlightened age is one of the strangest and saddest of all phenomena in human history.

The ineffable pity of it all.

LUCIAN JOHNSTON.

PEASANT PROPRIETORSHIP IN IRELAND.

In a former paper was given a brief survey of the Irish Agrarian question before 1880. The present paper will give an account of the remedial legislation which has been adopted in the matter since that time; firstly, for the creation of dual ownership and secondly, for the creation of peasant proprietorship.

I.

In 1881 a Royal Commission reported that the Land Act of 1870 had completely failed to protect the property rights of the Irish tenants; that the value of the tenants' improvements had been absorbed by the raising of rents. Mr. Gladstone, in the course of the same year had an Act passed through Parliament based on the report of the Commission. This Act embodied what are known as the three F's—fair rent, fixity of tenure and freedom of sale. The Government finally abandoned its *laissez-faire* policy and stepped in as arbiter between the landlord and tenant. (1) A tribunal was established to which tenants might have recourse in order to have a fair rent fixed. (2) Once the rent had been fixed it was to remain so for fifteen years, during which the tenant could not be evicted except for non-payment. (3) The tenant was empowered to sell his land, but before doing so he was obliged to consult the landlord, who had the right of pre-emption. These are the famous three F's. The law was to be administered by the newly-created Land Court, consisting of a judicial commissioner who was a Judge of the Supreme Court and an assistant Land Commissioner. Sub-Commissioners were to be appointed in the various provinces by the Land Commission, and to these all cases for the fixing of fair rents were in the first instance to be referred. Apart from the Land Commission, rents might be fixed also by County Courts or by free agreement between landlord and tenants.

The legislation of 1881 seemed to please nobody. Landlords were naturally chagrined at the thought of becoming mere rent chargers, and the number of Agrarian crimes continued to increase. Was the law, then, wrong in principle or did the fault lie with the Irish people? The Act undoubtedly lacked some of the features which would have widened the sphere of its operation, but this can scarcely justify the attitude of the Irish leaders toward it. It had been better on all sides had they given it a fair trial. It was the best that Mr. Gladstone could do at the time. It must be remembered that he could not go further than English public opinion allowed.

The objections of the Irish leaders to the legislation were mainly three. They objected to it in the first instance because it excluded tenants in arrears; secondly, because it excluded lease holders; thirdly, because it contained no standard for determining a fair rent. The Act of 1882 removed the first objection, stipulating that the tenants in arrears whose annual rent was less than thirty pounds should get a clear receipt on the payment of one year's rent.

The government agreed to pay another year's rent and the landlord was obliged to forfeit the remainder. Of the 135,977 claims for relief under this Act 129,952 were allowed. The sacrifice made by the government amounted to 812,321 pounds.[1]

The second objection was removed in 1887 when leaseholders were admitted to the benefits of the Act. Heretofore it had only applied to tenants from year to year, but the Act of 1887 declared that all tenants who had entered into leases not exceeding ninety-nine years were to be subject to the provisions of the Act of 1881 as if they were tenants from year to year. By these amendments 150,000 tenants were admitted to the benefits of the Act. Many of these were persons who under moral compulsion had contracted out their rights under the Act of 1870. The landlords who had taken advantage of the contracting out clauses were now caught in the meshes of legislation.

The first two objections had now been removed, but the third and the one most difficult to remove still remained. What was

[1] Brien's Life of Parnell, p. 340.

to be the standard of a fair rent? The Irish members maintained that Parliament should have fixed the standard, and it might easily have done so if it had only determined once for all the question of the ownership of improvements. But so long as this question remained unsettled there was no possibility of determining a standard of fair rent for Ireland. Adjustments of rent were bound to work an injustice against the tenants in many instances; the tenants' improvements were bound to be confiscated and they themselves robbed of all incentive to better their conditions. Since 1870 the presumption of English Law had been that the improvements belonged to the tenant, but this presumption created by the Law of 1870 had been in part nullified by a provision of the same law specifying length of enjoyment as a sufficient compensation for improvements. In the debate on the Act of 1881 Mr. Healy suggested a clause to the effect "that no rent should be made payable in respect of any improvements made by the tenant or his predecessors for which the tenant or his predecessors shall not have been paid by the landlord or his predecessors." As a concession to the opposition of the Lords, the clause was afterwards modified by the addition of the words "or otherwise compensated." The addition of these words gave the courts a chance of nullying the whole clause and of practically confiscating the tenants' improvements. A case was brought before the Dublin Court of Appeals and it was decided that the clause referred to improvements specified by the Act of 1870 to the exclusion of a great number of improvements included by that Act and that under the provisions of the same Act enjoyment of these improvements for upwards of twenty years should be counted sufficient compensation. The effect of this decision was to deprive the Irish tenants of the benefits of a great number of their improvements and to hand these improvements over to the landlord.

In this condition the law was allowed to remain until the Land Act of 1896 reversed the decision of the court and restored to the tenants the right to their improvements. According to this Act (1) No rent shall be payable by the tenants for improvements by reason of these improvements not being suit-

able to the land; (2) mere enjoyment of improvements for a period of twenty years or longer shall not be counted sufficient compensation; (3) the law also laid down certain definite rules for the guidance of the Commissioners in determining a fair rent; (a) they shall first estimate the gross rent which shall be determined by the value of the product; (b) they shall then deduct the amount due to tenants' improvements; (c) after having done this they shall determine the net fair rent.[2]

Had this question of the ownership of improvements been definitely settled in the beginning the great defect of the Land Commission would have been remedied. Once the idea was spread abroad that the Commissioners took advantage of improvements to raise rents the tenants were discouraged in the making of improvements. Nothing could have been more detrimental to the interests of the Irish tenant. He had inherited from the past a prejudice against making improvements because he had learned that he was thereby only increasing his landlord's rent. The new legislation tended to perpetuate this prejudice and thus to retard the economic progress of the Irish tenants.

But while the legislation of 1881 has conduced to the perpetuation of some of the traditional faults of the Irish tenants, it has considerably bettered their economic condition. It has put them in the position of making a livelihood off their land. Between August 22, 1881 and March 31, 1912, out of 490,300 occupiers of agricultural holdings in Ireland, 379,348 have had fair rents fixed for the first statutory term, receiving an average reduction of twenty and seven-tenths per cent. on their old rents. Of this number 140,540 have had fair rents fixed for a second statutory term, receiving an average reduction of nineteen and five-tenths per cent. on first-term rents. Of this number again 676 have had fair rents fixed for a third statutory term, receiving an average reduction of ten per cent. on second-term rents. These reductions would make the average judicial rent in Ireland at present less than ten shillings per statute acre.

[2] Act, Sec. 1, Sub-sec. 3.

II.

No matter how unbiased the judgments of the Land Court might have been, it could not have satisfied both parties. Every reduction of rent brought forth the severest criticism from the landlord's side. The tenants, too, were very rarely satisfied with their reductions. They maintained, among other things, that their reductions did not compensate for the fall in agricultural prices. It was therefore evident that no fixing of fair rents could satisfactorily settle the Irish Agrarian question and restore peace between landlord and tenant. There was bound to be friction so long as the inveterate enemies continued to meet in the courts every fifteen years to fight over the diminishing rent.

Back in 1870 a more perfect scheme of reform had been proposed to Mr. Gladstone by his friend John Bright. According to Bright the only means of solving the problem of land tenure in Ireland was the creation of peasant proprietorship. Mr. Gladstone hesitated. He saw countless difficulties in the way of creating peasant proprietors. He could not believe "that the purchase and owning of land by a few of the more fortunate tenants could bring any essential benefit to the people as a whole." [3] The great statesman had undoubtedly before his mind a difficulty which was to beset all future legislation aiming at the establishment of peasant proprietors. What would be the advantage of peasant proprietorship for the tenants occupying uneconomic holdings; namely, for those whose holdings are too small and too poor to afford a decent livelihood to the owner? Taking fifteen acres as the minimum for an economic holding, we find 200,000 uneconomic holdings out of a total of 490,315 in Ireland.[4] Peasant proprietorship might give the occupiers of these holdings twenty to thirty per cent. of a reduction on their fair rents, but this would not be sufficient to make their holdings economic, especially when these holdings, as is gen-

[3] Morley's Gladstone, Vol. 2, p. 283.
[4] Census of 1911.

erally the case, are situated in the most infertile parts of Ireland.

Despite this opposition to the land policy of Mr. Bright, Gladstone consented to introduce purchase clauses in the Church Disestablishment Act of 1869. These clauses enabled the tenants of the Church lands to become owners of their holdings. The government was to advance three-fourths of the purchase money which the tenants were obliged to repay in thirty-two annuities. Under this Act 6,057 tenants became proprietors of their holdings. The government continued the same policy in the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1870. The Bright clauses of that Act specified that the government would advance two-thirds of the purchase money to tenants who should buy their land through the Landed Estates Court. Repayments were to be made by the tenants in thirty-five annuities. Under this Act 877 tenants became owners of their lands. The Land Act of 1881 also contained purchase clauses which empowered the Land Commission to advance three-fourths of the purchase money to tenants for the purchase of their holdings. Repayments were to be made in the same manner as under the Act of 1870. Only 731 tenants become proprietors under the Act of 1881.

The first legislative attempts in the direction of peasant proprietorship had one obvious defect; they required too much from the tenants. The Irish tenants could not as a rule afford to pay one-third or one-fourth of the purchase money, and for this reason they were unable to take advantage of the purchase clauses of the Acts of 1869, 1870 and 1881.

The Irish members demanded "the land for the people," hence they severely criticized the Acts of 1870 and 1881 as mere half-way measures. Englishmen, on the other hand, were loath to invest money in the purchase of Irish land. To say the least they did not think it a safe investment on account of the recurring seasons of distress and the periodic famines. It took a long time to convice them that land purchase was a safe and sane policy and the only policy that could finally solve the Irish land problem. In 1885 the conservatives adopted

land purchase as their Irish policy and in the same year the Ashbourne Act—the first great legislative movement in the direction of peasant proprietorship—was passed by Parliament. The Ashbourne Act empowered the Land Commission to advance the whole amount to be paid by the tenant for the purchase of his holding. On no account, however, could the advances made by the Commission exceed in all the sum of five million pounds. The landlord was to be paid in cash, four-fifths down, one-fifth of the purchase money being retained by the government as security against non-payment by the tenants. The tenants were obliged to repay the money advanced for the purchase of their lands at the rate of four per cent. for forty-nine years, three per cent. on the principal and one per cent. for a sinking fund.

The popularity of the new measure was sufficiently attested by its success during the next three years. Applications for advances poured in at such a rate that the five million pounds was soon expended. Another five millions was voted in 1888, but by 1891 that, too, had been exhausted. In a short period of six years 25,367 tenants had become owners of their lands. The landlords' interests were capitalized at an average of seventeen and a half years' purchase; *i. e.,* seventeen and a half times the annual rent.

The Act of 1885 was considerably modified by the legislation of 1891 and 1896. The government realized that the creation of peasant proprietorship alone would not solve the Land question. It was therefore deemed necessary to pass special subsidiary legislation for the poorer or congested districts.[5] Steps were also taken toward expediting the creation of peasant proprietorship, and for this purpose Parliament decreed that the landlords for the future should be paid in land stock instead of cash as under the Act of 1885, and that the burden of securing the Treasury against non-payment of annuities should be transferred from the landlord to a complicated guarantee fund, based on taxation. It also established a system of decadal reductions

[5] See *Catholic University Bulletin* for January, 1914.

according to which the amount paid into the sinking fund was, at the end of each decade, to be deducted from the whole amount payable by the tenant, and his future rent calculated on the remainder. For instance, a tenant whose former rent was a hundred pounds, buys out his farm at seventeen years' purchase; that is, for a nominal sum of 1,700 pounds represented by land stock. On this nominal amount, which is advanced by the government, the tenant is obliged to pay four per cent. for the first ten years, making his annual rent for this period sixty-eight pounds. At the beginning of the second decade, the amount already paid into the sinking fund is deducted from the whole amount payable and the interest calculated on the remainder. This makes his rent for the second decade sixty-one pounds, four shillings.

The system of decadal reductions was a wise provision, for a tenant owing to a slump in agricultural prices or a series of crop failures, might not be able to pay the same amount in ten years as he was paying at first. The complicated guarntee fund based on a lack of confidence in the Irish tenants was an altogether unnecessary provision, as subsequent experience amply demonstrated. Instead of serving any useful purpose, it so complicated the law as to bring land purchase almost to a standstill.

The substitution of land stock for cash payments made the progress of land purchase depend on the fluctuations of the stock market. So long as the stock remained at par the landlord would be willing to sell his estate, but when stock went below par he would be no longer willing to sell. Between 1896 and 1900 the price of stock never went below par. Sometimes it went as high as one hundred and ten. A large number of landlords took advantage of the rise in the price of stock to enter agreements for the sale of their land. The number of applications made to the Commissioners rose from 1,503 in the year ending March 31, 1896 to 6,911 in the year ending March 31, 1900. But after the Boer War the value of stock suddenly went down with the result that land purchase came to a standstill.

III.

In 1900, it seemed as if the Irish ideal—"the land for the people"—would never be realized. Fifteen years had passed since the British Parliament took its first great step in the direction of peasant proprietorship, and yet only 70,000 out of a total of 490,301 tenants had become owners of their land. The worst landlords still held out, obliging their tenants to pay twenty-five per cent. more rent than the neighbornig tenants. The people grew discontented. Discontent and dissatisfaction spread according as the landlords became more obstinate in refusing to sell their estates. A general cry for compulsory purchase arose. A new organization sprang into existence and carried on a vigorous campaign against the obstinate landlords. So intense did the agitation become that it seemed as if there was going to be a revival under the auspices of the United Irish League, of the Agrarian warfare of Land League days. Mr. Wyndham, the Chief Secretary, realizing that something had to be done to allay the discontent of the people, introduced a bill into Parliament offering greater inducements to the landlords to sell and to the tenants to buy than had been offered under the Ashbourne or Balfour Acts. The reunited Irish party unanimously rejected the bill. At that time nothing other than compulsory purchase would have satisfied them. Before long, however, they were compelled to recede from their position and to make a compromise with the landlords. A conference was called to meet in Dublin to which representatives of the landlords and tenants were invited in order to discuss a policy of conciliation and at this conference a scheme of land purchase acceptable to both parties was drawn up.

The Wyndham Land Act of 1903 was based on the report of the Land conference. Its object was the speedy creation of peasant proprietorship which Mr. Wyndham thought would be accomplished within fifteen years. Like all previous Acts, it provided for the voluntary transfer of land from the landlord to the tenants. The independent landlord had refused to sell his land for depreciated land stock, hence it was thought necessary

for the future to pay him in cash, and for this purpose the government proposed to raise the sum of 100,000,000 pounds—the amount required to buy out the landlords who had not yet sold their land. The government was to raise this money by the issuance of stock, bearing interest at two and three-fourths per cent.[6]

In addition to the amount necessary to buy out their lands, the government offered a bonus of twelve million pounds to the landlords in order to induce them to sell. This bonus was to be distributed at the rate of twelve per cent. on the purchase money. The transfer of land was to be made through the hands of the Estates Commissioners, a new body created within the Land Commission, whose duty was to ratify all agreements entered into between the landlord and tenant for the sale and purchase of the Landlord's Estates.[7] All the advances made by the Land Commission have to be repaid by the tenants at the rate of three and one-fourth per cent. (two and three-fourths per cent. interest and one-half per cent. on the sinking fund) for sixty-eight and a half years. The interest to be paid on the advance is therefore the same as under the legislation of 1896, but the annual sum to be paid into the sinking fund is reduced from one to one-half per cent.[8] If the tenants refuse or are unable to meet their annuities, the deficit must be charged on the local taxation grants made by the Imperial Parliament.[9] Any loss sustained by the government in the issue of stock was to be made good out of the Irish Development Grant, which consisted of 185,000 pounds due to Ireland as an equivalent for the 1,400,000 pounds voted for educational purposes in England in 1902. When this fund should be exhausted, the deficit would have to be supplied out of the Imperial Grants for local purposes, and this would, of course, ultimately mean an increase of local taxation.

If one were to judge by the number of prospective proprietors which it has created, the Land Act of 1903 must be considered a great success. The number of purchases complete in the

[6] Acts, Sects. 27, 28, 29.
[7] Act, Sect. 1.
[8] Act, Sect. 45.
[9] Act, Sects. 26, 36.

period from November 1, 1903 to March 31, 1912 amounted to 136,350, and the advances made by the Commissioners in the same period amounted to 47,570,837 pounds, while the amount of the advances applied for was 82,311,466 pounds.[10] The average price which the landlord received for his land was twenty-two and nine-tenths times its annual rent, or twenty-five times, if we take the bonus into account. This represents a relative increase of forty per cent. on former prices.[11] The average reduction received by the tenants was about twenty-five cent.

The best testimony in favor of the Act of 1903 is the almost universal satisfaction with which it has been received by both landlords and tenants. The landlords were well pleased with the price which the Act held out to them; and while the tenants felt that they were paying a very high price for their land, still they were satisfied, for they knew that since the government was opposed to compulsory purchase, the only alternative which would induce the landlords to sell was a high price.

After the legislation of 1903 had been in operation for six years, it was discovered that some important modifications had to be made in it if the work of land purchase was to go on. The advances which had been made up to date entailed a great financial loss in as much as the government had been compelled to issue stock at an average discount of twelve per cent. In order to raise one hundred pounds, it had to issue stock having a nominal value of one hundred and twelve pounds while the tenant only paid interest on stock having a nominal value of one hundred pounds. The deficit so far had been met out of the Development Grant, but it was discovered that if the government continued much longer to issue stock at such a loss, the Development Grant would be exhausted and further losses would have to be borne by the Irish ratepayers. This defect in the legislation of 1903 was remedied in 1909 by a provision that for the future the Treasury would raise money by the issue of stock bearing interest at the rate of three per cent. instead of two and

[10] Thom's Official Directory, p. 779.
[11] Dubois' Contemporary Ireland, p. 292.

three-fourths as under the former Act.[12] Any losses sustained by the Treasury in the issue of stock were to be made good in the first instance out of the Development Grant and as soon as that was exhausted, out of money provided by Parliament.[13]

In 1909 it was also deemed necessary to make certain modifications in regard to the bonus to be given to the landlords. Twelve millions had been set aside by Mr. Wyndham for this purpose, which would give the landlords a twelve per cent. bonus on the assumption that 100,000,000 pounds should be sufficient to buy out their estates. But when the period for which the bonus was to be given had expired (November 1, 1908) proceedings had been instituted for the sale of estates to the amount of seventy or eighty millions, and it was estimated that it would take another eighty millions to buy out the remainder of the land. The Act of 1909 removed the twelve million limit, and also changed the method of distributing the bonus. It determined that for the future it should be distributed in a graduated scale ranging from three to eighteen per cent. in inverse proportion to the number of years purchase. The higher the price which the landlord received for his land, the smaller would be his bonus, and the lower the price the larger the bonus.

The Act of 1909 was an improvement on the former legislalation in many respects. By raising the rate of interest to be paid on land stock it made it easier for the government to secure money; it relieved the tenants from the burden of bearing the losses resulting from the flotation of stock below par; and as a result of the increased rate of interest to be paid by the government on land stock, the tenants have to pay an additional one-fourth per cent. on their annuities.

Although an improvement on the legislation of 1903, the Act of 1909 does not seem to have expedited in any great degree the work of land purchase. In fact it does not seem to have worked as well as the former Act. The amount of the advances applied for under the Act of 1903 up to March 31st, 1912, was 82,311,448 pounds while the amount of the advances applied for under the Act of 1909 up to that date amounted to

[12] Act, Sect. 1. [13] Act, Sect. 7.

3,460,073 pounds.[14] The foregoing figures seem to show that the progress of land purchase has been rather slow since 1909. This slownes, however, is not due to any fault in the existing legislation. The real reason for it is that nearly all the landlords who were willing to sell had already entered into agreements with their tenants and those who have so far refused to consider the question will not sell their lands except at excessively high rates or under compulsion. There is, then, only one means left of completing the work of creating a peasant proprietorship and that is compulsory sale. The idea would undoubtedly cause a shock to those who over-emphasize the rights of private property even when there is a question of ameliorating the condition of a whole people and giving them an opportunity of securing a decent livelihood. When John Bright and John Stuart Mill first proposed the compulsory buying out of the landlords over forty years ago they excited a storm of opposition in England. Englishmen at that time did not feel that the Irish had any human rights to be protected; they were satisfied that the existing system was good enough for Ireland, and even after they had been convinced that the Irish tenants deserved legislative consideration they still held back from what seemed to them the extreme measure of compelling the landlords to sell their estates. They would try every other means first before resorting to compulsion. They would offer a high price and a large bonus to the landlords in order to induce them to sell to their tenants. By this policy of conciliation the government has been able to establish a large number of peasant proprietors. But for the past five years, it has become more and more apparent that any system which leaves the landlords free to sell their estates can never satisfy the demands of the Irish tenants or complete the land policy of the government.

In 1909 the Liberal government found that a system of conciliation could not solve the problem of the congested estates. It was, therefore, deemed necessary to furnish the Land Commissioners with compulsory powers of acquiring land for the

[14] Thom's Official Directory, p. 779.

tenants of such estates; and the same compulsory powers, which were given to the Commissioners to acquire land in the congested estates outside of the Congested Districts were also given to the Congested Districts Board to acquire land inside the Congested Districts.

The leaders of the Liberal Party are now convinced that the same policy of compulsory purchase which has already been applied in the congested estates, must be extended to the whole country. They are convinced that compulsory purchase is the only means left of completing the work of creating a peasant proprietorship in Ireland. A bill for the purpose of endowing the Commissioners with compulsory powers of acquiring land was introduced into the last session of Parliament and this bill will undoubtedly become law within the next two years. Then will the Irish ideal "the land for the people" be realized.

JOHN O'GRADY.

FROM JOHN STUART MILL TO WILLIAM JAMES.

Introduction.

English philosophy contains throughout its course a predominant appeal to experience. From the days of its founder, Francis Bacon, the empirical method is claimed by all successive philosophers to be the one method of knowledge, whatever be the differences of their individual standpoint. As T. M. Forsyth puts it: "Nothing is more characteristic of English philosophy than the insistence, on the part of each of the thinkers in turn, that his system is grounded on experience. However they differ from one another either in their fundamental tenets or in points of detail, they agree that philosophy consists in reflexion on, or interpretation of, experience. The one common feature throughout the variations of English philosophy is this insistence on experience as the ultimate starting point and basis. This constitutes an element of agreement underlying its opposition." [1]

Bacon's philosophy, as embodied in the *Novum Organum,* manifests his zeal for that "closeness to fact" which is the distinctive feature of every inductive method. He wishes to renounce the elevation of abstract thought above fact. The renovation of philosophy is to be effected by a return to experience and a new devotion to particular facts, thus rising step by step to universal truths.[2]

With the next great English thinker, Thomas Hobbes, the deductive method, indeed, again acquires predominance. But it has nothing of the arbitrary *à priori* character of Descartes and his continental followers. Philosophy, says Hobbes, is a reasoning concerning experience. We must begin it with a contemplation of experience in all its complex variety of

[1] T. M. Forsyth, English Philosophy, Adam and Charles Black, London, 1910, p. 6.

[2] *Novum Organum*, bk. I. Aphorisms 19, 22.

features and seek to detect their common aspects and general principles. Such principles must then be employed for the explanation of phenomena, and the more general of them used to account for the less general. This is the rational interpretation of experience, or the explanation of it by general principles.[3]

But Hobbes shows a more profound conception than Bacon of the philosophic problem, in pushing his inquiry to the examination of the ultimate constitution of experience itself.[4] He finds the fundamental fact of experience to be ipsum τὸ φαίνεσθαι Accordingly the first and foremost problem of philosophy concerns the constitution and origin of phenomena as such.

In demanding as prerequisite the inquiry concerning the character of phenomena as such, Hobbes becomes the direct forerunner of John Locke. It needs but a slight shifting of the emphasis in his manner of putting the problem. Hobbes did not differentiate the investigation of phenomena as facts of consciousness from that of their physical or physiological condition. Locke, on the contrary, disregards the question of the dependence of conscious facts on organic facts, and lays the entire stress on the investigation of the ideas themselves.[5]

He begins his account of the nature and origin of ideas by distinguishing two sources or kinds of experience, sensation and reflection. It is the first time that reflection is regarded as a source of experience. Again the mind is said to be passive in the reception of its ideas. Consequently experience, consisting ultimately of a multiplicity of unitary items of consciousness, is the outcome of the juxta-position of individual minds with an independently existing world. This antithesis of material and mental world gives rise to the central problem of modern philosophy, the initial phase of the problem being to account for the origin of experience concerning reality on the supposition of the mutual independence of mind and matter. This independent interpretation of conscious experience from the nature of its own content works the transition from the dogmatic to the critical stand-point. However, the ideas are still considered as rep-

[3] *De Corpore*, ch. vi.
[4] *De Corpore*, ch. xxv.
[5] Essay concerning Human Understanding, bk. I., ch. i.

resentations of external realities; only the secondary qualities are denied.[6]

George Berkeley, continuing this method of intra-mental analysis, soon arrives at the denying of the validity of any distinction between primary and secondary qualities; both are purely mental. And pushing the analysis still further, he formulates his famous principle: the esse of things is percipi; their existence consists in their being consciously experienced.[7] This deduction is quite logical, for if sensible qualities as we actually experience them are the only material existence we can ever know, then our experience is quite the same with or without a material substance underlying.

The philosophy of David Hume is thus foreshadowed: Our conscious life is the experiencing of sensations, and these sensations, or "impressions" are the elements of our knowledge. Originally there is in our conscious life no distinction between ideas and things as objects of these ideas, nor again between mind and its ideas, as products of the mind. Any such conception is already an interpretation of the character of our ideas as contents of experience, and the criterion of the meaning and truth of any concept is the impression, or impressions, from which it is derived. Therefore, the idea of a substance, whether material or mental, is a mere fiction to which no objectivity corresponds.[8]

Regarding the relations obtaining between ideas, Hume wavers. There are passages where he resolves all relations into natural relations, and admits as the only "bond of union" or "principle of connexion" among ideas—the only "quality by which one idea naturally introduces another"—the principle of association. In other passages, however, he speaks of intuitively certain ideas, admitting a distinction between "relations of ideas," and "matters of fact," the former discoverable by thought without any reference to actual existence, the latter ascertainable only from experience.

[6] *Ibid.*, bk. II., ch. VIII.
[7] Principles of Human Knowledge, § 6.
[8] Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, sect. II.

Hume's philosophical heir is John Stuart Mill. The disciple goes beyond his master in resolutely denying any distinction between immanent and exterior relations of ideas. Exterior relations alone exist, and they find their explanation entirely in the law of association. All differentiation between psychology and epistemology is thus definitely done away with, the latter is subordinated to the former. It means the inauguration of psychologism.

Thus English philosophy from Bacon down to Mill presents a continuous development in accordance with the principle that the basis of all knowledge is experience.

But never, perhaps, was this appeal to experience so persistently and loudly reiterated as by the representatives of the latest phase of English philosophy, the champions of pragmatism. Besides, William James, their leader, lays claim to John Stuart Mill as the thinker from whom he "first learned the pragmatic openness of mind." Now the biological conception of mental life, and the dynamic theory of truth propounded by James, at first sight seem very unlike Mill's apparently static principle of association. It will, therefore, be the aim of the present paper to trace the points of contact between these two philosophers with a view of establishing, whether the constant continuity and evolution that mark the progress of English philosophy from Bacon to Mill, is likewise found between Mill and James. For the sake of clearness and brevity the inquiry will be limited to the study of the central questions in epistemology.

Psychology and the Problem of Universals.

It has just been said that Mill first subordinated logic to psychology, thus inaugurating in England the school of psychologists. The arguments of the latter are well known: Concepts, judgments, reasonings, constituting thought, are facts of consciousness, psychic operations; hence the laws of thought are psychological laws. They present merely a translation into normative formulas of the regularities observed in our mental operations. Consequently the so-called logic laws are simply

facts to be established inductively; they have no *à priori* ideal character of necessity founded upon a transcendental reason. We cannot, therefore, leave the territory of psychology; epistemology is but a chapter of psychology; its laws are subjective and changing, conscious experience being their only foundation.[9]

To this the supporters of ideal logic have always answered that the theory of knowledge is, indeed, born on the territory of psychic facts, but that by the very analysis of these facts of consciousness we are led to a distinction between laws of psychic activity and ideal laws, the former regarding the psychic act and the latter its content, the one the Denkerlebnis and the other the Denkinhalt. In the midst of the stream of consciousness, they maintain, there reigns an ideal objectivity, namely, fixed intemporal relations of the "intended" objects, and all that psychology says of the dynamic nature of conscious activity leaves intact the entirely different character of these ideal objects. We see the intrinsic relations of congruity founded on the inmost nature of the objects, we do not posit them; this gives us absolute truth. Evidence is hence no accessory sentiment superadded to our subjective judgments, but our very consciousness of an objective agreement.[10]

Mill himself starts his analysis by contending that the problem of knowledge can only be solved by remaining within consciousness, and by analyzing its contents. And what does he find consciousness to be? It is a series of feelings, that is, of sensations, thoughts, emotions and volitions, more or less numerous and complicated.[11] Objects, things do not enter the conscious field except by their representations. And since all the contents of consciousness are subjective, these relations must likewise be subjective, forming, as they do, but a part of the concrete thread of consciousness, subject as such to the general

[9] Joseph Geyer, *Grundlagen der Logik und Erkenntnislehre,* Muenster, H. Schoening, 1909, p. 266.

[10] Joseph Geyer, *Lehrbuch der Allgemeinen Psychologie,* Muenster, Schoening, 1912, pp. 546-556.

[11] A System of Logic, George Routlege, London, 1905, p. 47.

causal laws of the latter. In other words, truth corresponds to psychologic law.

How rigorously Mill defends this subordination of logic to psychology may be seen from the following characteristic page: "If this be meant (that ideal laws belong to logic) we are landed in a strange conclusion. There is a science, psychology, which is the science of all mental phenomena, and among others, of the phenomena of thought, and yet another science, logic, is required to teach us its necessary phenomena. There is a portion of the properties of thought which is expressly excluded from the science which treats of thought, to be reserved as the matter of another science, and these are precisely its necessary properties. Those which are merely contingent, 'such as may or may not appear'—the properties which are not common to all thought, or do not belong to it at all times—these, it seems to be said, psychology knows something about: but the necessary properties, 'such as cannot but appear'—the properties which all thoughts possess, which thought must possess, without the possession of which it would not be thought—these psychology knows not of, and it is the office of a different science to investigate them. We may next expect to be told that the science of dynamics knows nothing of the laws of motion, the composition of forces, the theory of continuous and accellerating force, the doctrines of momentum, *vis viva,* etc., it only knows of mind power, and water power, steam power and animal power." [12]

If we turn to James, we will find the same genetic view of truth. Perhaps this appears nowhere more lucidly than in his way of handling the great problem which forms the pivotal epistemological question between psychologists and the supporters of Pure Logic, namely, the problem of Universals.

It was the analytical genius of Kant that first posed this problem in its modern critical form. For ten years, the philosopher of Koenigsberg tells us, he struggled and meditated asking himself on what to base the absolute, transcendental value of the universal judgments, the categories admitted by common sense,

[12] An examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy, Third Edition, London, p. 443.

seeing that all our concrete experiences are individual. In his technical terminology: "How are synthetic *à priori* judgments possible?" On analyzing the Gewühl der Erscheinungen und Rhapsodie der Wahrnehmungen of our conscious experience, he found within the mind a unitive function which, when put in presence of the diversity of sensible experience, construes the categories. These categories are consequently but the different possible ways in which the sense data may be synthetized, the intrinsic relations uniting them. The syntheses lie buried in the sense data, and the mind in discovering them actualizes them. The union is, therefore, not arbitrary, and the resulting judgments, the categories, have an objective, universal value.[13]

James' way of approaching the problem of Universals will show us besides the psychologic, his specifically pragmatic point of view. For him the activity of the mind is only a chapter of general biology. Its purpose is to adapt us to our surroundings, and to prepare our reactions.[14] Now the better to handle the stream of concrete experiences, man, says James, in very early times invented certain Denkmittel, a system of general concepts, categories, to which he refers the impressions presenting themselves, thus classifying and understanding them more easily. Nothing objective, however, corresponds to these categories; they result solely from the repetition of experiences. Had experience been simple, logic would have been impossible.[15]

The categories are, then, merely human "artefacts," instrumental and fundamental ways of thinking, discoveries of our exceedingly remote ancestors, which have been able to preserve themselves throughout the experience of all subsequent time. But it might be that such categories, unimaginable by us today, would have proved on the whole as serviceable for handling our experiences mentally as those which we actually use.[16]

In fact, what does history tell us of the evolution of logic?

[13] We are here adopting Riehl's objective interpretation of Kant; cf. Alois Riehl, *Der Philosophische Kritizismus I,*[2] Leipzig, Engelmann, 1908, pp. 499 ff.

[14] A Pluralistic Universe, Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1909, p. 350.

[15] Pragmatism, Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1910, p. 179.

[16] Pragmatism, pp. 170-171.

When the first logical and natural uniformities, the first laws, were discovered, men were so carried away by the clearness, beauty and simplification that resulted that they believed themselves to have deciphered authentically the eternal thoughts of the Almighty. His mind also thundered in syllogisms. He also thought in conic sections, squares and roots. Euclid's elements literally reproduced his geometrizing. He made Kepler's laws for the planets to follow; he made velocity to increase proportionally to the time in falling bodies. In short, there is an eternal and unchangeable reason reverberating in Barbara and Celarent, and the laws of nature are exact duplicates of prehuman archytypes buried in the structure of things, to which the spark of divinity hidden in our intellect enables us to penetrate: the anatomy of the world is logical.[17]

But sciences developed farther, bringing an enormously rapid multiplication of theories, so that finally we became accustomed to the notion that no theory is absolutely a transcript of reality. There are so many logics that the notion that even the truest formula may be a human device and not a literal transcript has dawned upon us. They are a man-made language, conceptual shorthand, true as far as they go and are useful, but no farther. Human arbitrariness has driven divine necessity from logic.[18]

Thus the extrinsic concept of law is substituted for the intrinsic mutual relation of phenomena. In other words, no universal denknotwendige Urteile are to be admitted; at most we may arrive at empirically universal judgments: we observe that in the past certain phenomena have invariably followed each other, and we conclude thence that they will continue to do so in the future. In the terms of Leibnitz, there exist no vérités de raison but only vérités de fait. Experience, not reason, becomes the ultimate criterion.

This is also precisely Mill's attitude toward the problem of Universals. He, too, contends that they are mere experimental truths, with no validity transcending experience. They are inductive truths resting upon the evidence of sense.[19] Wit-

[17] Pragmatism, pp. 55-57.
[18] Pragmatism, p. 57.
[19] Logic, p. 168.

ness Mill's energetic answer to those who object that it is not experience which proves an ideal truth, but that this truth is apperceived *à priori* the very moment we apprehend the meaning of the proposition—without any necessity of certifying it by repeated trials. The example objected was the axiom that two straight lines cannot inclose a space.

"They cannot, however, but allow that the truth of the axiom, Two straight lines cannot inclose a space, even if evident independently of experience, is also evident from experience. Whether the axiom needs confirmation or not, it receives configuration in almost every instant of our lives; since we cannot look at any two straight lines which intersect one another, without seeing that from that point they continue to diverge more and more. Experimental proof crowds in upon us in such endless profusion, and without one instance in which there can be even a suspicion of an exception to the rule, that we should soon have a stronger ground for believing the axiom, even on an experimental truth, than we have for almost any of the general truths which we confessedly learn from the evidence of our senses. Independently of *à priori* evidence, we should certainly believe it with an intensity of conviction far greater than we accord to any ordinary physical truth: and this, too, at a time of life much earlier than that from which we date almost any part of our acquired knowledge, and much too early to admit of our retaining any recollection of the history of our intellectual operations of that period. Where then is the necessity for assuming that our recognition of these truths has a different origin from the rest of our knowledge, when its existence is perfectly accounted for by supposing its origin to be the same? When the causes which produce belief in all other circumstances, exist in this instance, and in a degree of strength as much superior to that which exists in other cases, as the intensity of the belief itself is superior." [20]

Under a differently arrayed form we have here again the fundamental dogma of the psychologists that the question concerning the origin of knowledge is purely a psychologico-genetic

[20] Examination, p. 154.

one, to be formulated: How does man arrive at his knowledge? There exists only one source and standard of knowledge: experimental induction. The soul is a virgin page at its birth; knowledge enters therein by sense-perception and observation. Now, since it has experience for its only source, its validity can never go beyond that experience. Consequently no ulterior logico-epistemological considerations are to be admitted, such as: What is the origin of knowledge with regard to its intrinsic validity? or, as Kant expressed it, if we are to believe Riehl's interpretation: "Diese Begriffe moegen uns beiwohnen, woher sie wollen (die Frage ist) woher nehmen wir die Verknuepfung derselben?" [21]

However, the believers in transcendental logic still insist that experience can observe and record only what has happened, but that she cannot find, in any case, or in any accumulation of cases, any reason for what must happen. She may see objects side by side, but she cannot see a reason why they must ever be side by side. She finds certain events to occur in succession, but the succession supplies in its occurrence no reason for its recurrence. She contemplates external objects; but she cannot detect any internal bond which indissolubly connects the future with the past, the possible with the real. Whereas necessary, universal truths are those in which we not only learn that the proposition is true, but see that it must be true; in which we cannot, even by an effort of imagination, or in supposition, conceive the reverse of that which is asserted.

How do Mill and James answer this final appeal to the intrinsic inconceivableness of the reverse of any proposition as a witness against the experimental origin of our conviction? Mill responds by exhorting us to study the elementary laws of association, "being convinced that nothing more is requisite than a moderate familiarity with those laws, to dispel the illusion which ascribes a peculiar necessity to our earliest instructions from experience, and measures the possibilities of things in themselves by the human capacity of conceiving them." [22]

[21] Alois Riehl, *Logik und Erkenntnistheorie, Systematische Philosophie*, in *Kultur der Gegewart*, Leipzig, 1908, p. 90.

[22] Logic, p. 160.

These laws of association the author defines as follows: (a) Similar phenomena tend to be thought of together; (b) Phenomena which have either been experienced or conceived in close contiguity (in simultaneity or immediate succession) to one another, tend to be thought of together; (c) When two phenomena have been very often experienced in conjunction, and have not in any single instance, occurred separately, there is produced between them what has been called inseparable association; (d) When association has acquired this character of inseparability, things which we are unable to conceive apart, appear incapable of existing apart, and the belief we have in their co-existence, though really a product of experience, seems intuitive.[23]

James has no less ingenious an answer. Relations of every sort, he says, are just as integral members of the sensational flux as the terms are. Suppose the same two terms will return again, then you will necessarily perceive the same relation again, for they are matters of immediate perception. Besides, later, both terms and relations get universalized by being conceptualized and named.[24] The terms now become our abstract productions, and we can hence keep them invariant; we can make them timeless by decreeing that on the things we "mean" time shall exert no altering effect; that they are intentionally abstracted from every corrupting condition. But relations between invariant objects will themselves be invariant. Again, they are relations of comparison, and as such matters of direct inspection. As soon as mental objects are mentally compared, they are perceived to be either like or unlike. But once the same, always the same, under these timeless conditions. Which is as much as to say that truths concerning these man-made objects are necessary and eternal. We can change our conclusions only by changing our data first. The whole fabric of the *à priori* sciences can thus be treated as a man-made product.[25]

In reality this is simply begging the question, which last was

[23] Examination, pp. 222-223.

[24] A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 279-280.

[25] The Meaning of Truth, Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1909, pp. 83-85.

precisely, whether the same sense data can ever appear in different relations from those which the intellectualist calls intrinsic, not whether we may regard them as often as we chose in a given relation. In other words, whether the same two terms must always return in the same relation within the flux of conscious experience. This, however, would, as we saw, be radically opposed to all pragmatic principles whose first canon reads that the flux of experience is epistemologically autonomous; that is, the nexus between its data is purely external.

Mill's explanation, too is in last analysis a pseudo-solution. He denies all immanent connection of ideas by explaining the necessary or intuitive principles as instances of the "inseparable association" acquired by ideas that are constantly conjoined in our experience. Still, if he desires to remain logical, he must admit that any association generated by experience, may subsequently be destroyed by experience.

What has already been said might suffice to demonstrate how James is one with Mill in denying that the laws of thought are independent of their subjective psychical experience, transcendental and absolute; and in affirming psychology to be the ultimate source and foundation of truth, thus reducing all logical laws to psychologic ones, as such relative, subjective and empirical. We will adduce, however, two more striking parallel passages which admirably and succinctly show the doctrinal agreement of these two philosophers.

Mill writes: "We need experience in order to inform us in what cases, or in what sort of cases, experience is to be relied upon. Experience must be consulted in order to learn from it under what circumstances arguments from it will be valid. We have no ulterior test to which we subject experience in general; but we make experience its own test." [26] Compare these words of James: "Though one part of our experiences may lean upon another part to make it what it is in any one of several aspects in which it may be considered, experience as a whole is self-containing and leans on nothing." [27]

In almost the very same words we find here repeated their

[26] Logic, p. 192. [27] Meaning, p. 124.

common psychological-contention that conscious experience, being the source of all our knowledge, must likewise be the foundation of its validity: that it is the ultimate criterion of truth.

The Truth-Relation and Reality.

Common sense, scholasticism, the college-trained younger sister of common sense, as James calls her, and intellectualist philosophies in general have always upheld the correspondence theory of truth: *veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus,* which means to say, truth is a relation between an idea and an object outside or transcendent of it. More precisely, for an idea to be true the object must be " as " the idea declares it.

James readily admits that truth means agreement of our ideas with reality, but he emphatically denies that this implies the static relation of the intellectualists. For him truth is a genetic process. Pragmatism, he says, converts the absolutely empty notion of a static relation of correspondence between our minds and reality into that of a rich and active commerce between particular thoughts of ours and the great universe of other experiences in which they play their parts and have their uses.[28] True ideas are those we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas are those we cannot. The truth of an idea is hence not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to an idea. The latter becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process, the process of its verification. Its validity is the process of its validation. And what do these words verification and validation mean? They signify certain practical consequences: the ideas lead us through acts or other ideas which they instigate to the parts of experience to which they refer. Just as in ordinary life I call that path the true one which leads me to the place I intend to reach.[29]

The intellectualist claims that for an idea to be true the object must be " as " the idea declares it. I, replies James,

[28] Pragmatism, p. 69.
[29] Pragmatism, pp. 201-204.

explicate this "as"-ness as meaning the idea's verificability, maintaining that there is no meaning left in this notion of as-ness if no reference to the possibility of concrete working on the part of the idea is made.[30] The originals and prototype of truth-processes are fully verified leadings, all other forms of truth-processes are primary verifications arrested; indirect verifications passing muster for direct ones where circumstantial evidence is sufficient. Verificability in these cases is as good as direct verification. In fact, for one truth-process completed there are a million in our lives that function in this state of nascency.[31] Potentiality counts for actuality.[32] Thus agreement turns out to be essentially an affair of leading.[33] The links of experience sequent upon an idea, which mediate between it and reality, form and for the pragmatist indeed are, the concrete relation of truth that may obtain between the truth and that reality.[34]

Such, then, is James' dynamic relation, as opposed to the static relation of the intellectualists. Instead of objective correspondence, verificability, or the working of an idea, now becomes the fundamentum of the truth-relation. From transcendent agreement the stress is shifted to the natural result of this agreement, that is, to its verificability. (The effect is falsely substituted for the cause, the intellectualist would retort.) The question is no longer, what is truth, but how is it arrived at; not, when is an idea true, but, when do we know it to be true.

No doubt, the intellectualist will qualify all this as mere descriptive psychology, a description of the functioning of concrete psychologic facts, and not an objective theory of truth. If James, nevertheless, presents it as a genuine epistemological theory, it is because of his purely psychological conception of the stream of consciousness. Consistent and loyal to his principles, James therefore calls his account of truth an account of truths in the plural. Truth for him is simply a collective name for verification processes.[35] What intellectualism calls the

[30] Meaning, p. 171.
[31] Pragmatism, pp. 206-208.
[32] Meaning, p. 164.
[33] Pragmatism, pp. 212-215.
[34] Meaning, p. 201.
[35] Pragmatism, p. 218.

truth, the inherent truth, is only the abstract name for truthfulness in act, for the fact that the ideas there do lead to the supposed reality in a way that we consider satisfactory.[36]

Thence results an important corollary: There exists no absolute truth. The "absolutely" true, meaning what no farther experience will ever alter, is that ideal vanishing-point toward which we imagine that all our temporary truths will some day converge. Meanwhile we have to live today by what truths we can get today, and be ready tomorrow to call it falsehood.[37] In other words, truth being psychologic, must ever remain subjective and relative.[38]

Let us return to Mill, in order to see his conception of the truth-relation. How did Mill propound his view? "Concepts, judgments and reasonings should agree with the reality of things, meaning by things the phenomena or sensible presentations, to which those mental products have reference. A concept to be rightly framed, must be a concept of something real, and must agree with the real fact which it endeavors to represent; that is, the collection of attributes composing the concept must really exist in the objects marked by the class-name, and in no other. A judgment to be rightly framed, must be a true judgment; that is, the objects judged of must really possess the attributes predicated of them.[39] In no case can thinking be valid unless the concepts, judgments and conclusions resulting from it are conformable to fact. We must ascend to the original sources, the presentations of experience, and examine the train of thought in relation to these." [40]

This definition of truth will, in the obvious meaning of the terms, find the unqualified approbation of both Kantian phe-

[36] Meaning, p. 202.

[37] Pragmatism, pp. 222-223.

[38] As Hermant and Van De Warle put it: "La vérité, au point de vue pragmatique, devient ainsi essentiellement dynamic et évolutive, elle ne se pose plus nulle part en tout qu' absolu, soit réalisé, soit à atteindre, car, puisque sa validité ne repose sur aucune évidence qui lui soit inherente, elle ne peut être eternellement immuable, cf. Les Principales Theories de la Logique Contemporaine, Félix Alcan, Paris, 1909, p. 214.

[39] Examination, p. 455.

[40] Examination, p. 454.

nomenalist and critical realist; it presents a frank endorsement of the intellectualist principle: veritas est adæquatio rei et intellectus. Surely, it seems far from evidencing any affinity to the pragmatic notion of truth. However, it will be remembered that James, too, had admitted the agreement formula, and that the ways of intellectualism and pragmatism had only parted when the question of interpreting the formula arose. We must therefore turn to Mill's interpretation.

As we saw above, Mill holds that the problem of knowledge can only be solved by an analysis of consciousness—finding ourselves, as we do, on this side of the epistemological chasm. Conscious life, he told us, is a continued series of feelings in which the sensation of the moment (that of a house seen at a distance, for instance) is but a passing mental movement rising above a certain degree of intensity. How, then, are we to conceive the truth-relation and to interpret the agreement formula?

Speaking of the subject and object of our sensations Mill observes: "The thread of consciousness which I apprehend the sensation as a part of, is the subject of the sensation. The group of permanent possibilities of sensation to which I refer it, and which is partially realized and actualized in it, is the object of the sensation." [41] In other words, if I consider a sensation in its relation to some group, or some kind of group of permanent possibilities of sensation, the present existence of which is certified to me by the sensation I am at the moment feeling, I am referring it to the object of the sensation. Permanent possibilities of sensation are Mill's substitute for reality, as we shall see presently.[42]

According to this explanation, then, to appeal to the test of facts in order to ascertain truth, means to appeal to our permanent possibilities of sensation. Now these permanent possibilities of sensation are in themselves nothing but the sum-total of our actual and possible sentient experience itself. And this experience is essentially changeable.

[41] Examination, p. 259.

[42] See page 158 below.

We have come back to the above corollary of James: Truth must forever remain relative, it is entirely an "intra-experiential affair." [43] What is true today may be false tomorrow. We must speak of truths in the plural, not of the truth. The emphasis centres around the unstable predicate and truth thus becomes dynamic.

Compare also this strikingly similar passage of James with the words just quoted from Mill: "Truth means the relation of less fixed parts of experience (predicates) to others relatively more fixed parts (subjects), and we are not required to seek it in a relation of experience as such to anything beyond itself." [44]

* * * *

These last words usher in the final and supreme problem of epistemology, namely the question whether there is a transcendent reality, an extra-experimental *Ding-an-sich,* that keeps the ball of our psychic life rolling, an "absolute" that lies eternally behind all the successive determinations which human thought has made. So far we always spoke of reality as its conscious, sentient experience.

Mill's manner of solving this problem has become famous as the most logical defense of idealism. The pages he has written on this subject are still considered as classic by many. Among others the late celebrated Paulsen of Berlin makes them almost completely his own.[45] Mill embarks on his analysis by observing that common sense has always recognized a distinction between "the self," or ego, and a world external to it, but of which it can in some mode and measure take cognizance. The most fundamental question in philosophy must therefore be, he continues, to determine what we are able to know of these external objects, and by what evidence we know of them. How can we ever, being limited to the phenomena of our inner world, arrive at the trans-subjective? Objects, says Mill, are known to us through the senses. By those channels and not otherwise

[43] Meaning, p. 133. [44] Meaning, p. 133.

[45] Fredrich Paulsen, *Einleitung in die Philosophie,* Cotta'sche Buchhandlung Nachfolger, Berlin, 1906, pp. 397-406.

do we learn whatever we do learn concerning them. Without the senses we should not know nor suspect that such things existed. We know no more of what they are than the senses tell us, nor does nature afford us any means of knowing more.

But what is it that the senses tell us concerning objects? About one part of the information they give, there is no dispute. They tell us our sensations. The objects excite, or awaken in us, certain states of feeling. What we term the properties of an object are the powers it exerts of producing sensations in our consciousness.[46]

And here Mill parts company with realistic common sense in order to set off in his own idealistic direction. The sensations, he says, which, in common parlance, we are said to receive from objects, are not only all that we can possibly know of the objects, but are also all that we have any grounds for believing to exist. What we term an object is but a complex conception, made up by the laws of association, out of the ideas of various sensations which we are accustomed to receive simultaneously. There is nothing real in the process but these sensations. They do not, indeed, accompany or succeed one another at random; they are held together by a law, that is, they occur in fixed groups, and a fixed order of succession: but we have no evidence of anything which, not being itself a sensation, is a substratum or hidden cause of sensations. The idea of such a substratum is a purely mental creation to which we have no reason to think that there is any corresponding reality exterior to our minds.[47]

It is true, continues Mill, that I cannot doubt my present impression: I cannot doubt that when I perceive color or weight, I perceive them as in an object. Neither can I doubt that when I look at two fields, I perceive which of them is the farthest off. But, he explains, this reference of our sensible impressions to an external object is acquired, and though a fact of our consciousness in its present artificial state, it would have no claim to the title of consciousness generally, not having been in consciousness from the beginning.[48] No attempt to

[46] Examination, pp. 6-7.
[47] Examination, p. 157.
[48] Examination, p. 8.

determine what are the direct revelations of consciousness can be successful or entitled to any regard, unless preceded by an inquiry into the origin of our acquired ideas. For we have it not in our power to ascertain, by any direct process, what consciousness told us at the time when its revelations were in their pristine purity. It only offers itself to our inspection as it exists now, when those original revelations are overlaid and buried under a mountainous heap of acquired notions and perceptions.[49]

This leads us to Mill's central argument: Consciousness, as we saw, reveals to us our sensations, and of these latter alone we have absolute certainty. Hence, he concludes, if any mode can be pointed out in which, within the compass of possibility, the belief in matter might have been brought about, we are no longer entitled to conclude that this conviction is an original deliverance of consciousness. Now the laws of association are capable of creating this belief out of those uncontested data of consciousness. Whence results that matter is a purely subjective mental conception, to which no objective reality corresponds.[50] We have here an application of the law of parsimony to ontology.

Mill develops this argument at length. What is it we mean, he asks, or what is it which leads us to say, that the objects we perceive are external to us, and not a part of our own thoughts? We mean, is his answer, that there is concerned in our perceptions something which exists when we are not thinking of it; which existed before we had ever thought of it, and would exist if we were annihilated; and further, that there exist things which we never saw, touched, or otherwise perceived, and things which never have been perceived by man. This idea of something which is distinguished from our fleeting impressions by what, in Kantian language, is called perdurability, something which is fixed and the same, while our impressions vary; something which exists whether we are aware of it or not, constitutes altogether our idea of external substance. All this, affirms Mill, is but the form impressed by the known laws of

[49] Examination, p. 171. [50] Examination, p. 172.

association,[51] upon the conception or notion, obtained by experience, of contingent sensations.[52]

Again, the conception I form of the world existing at any moment, comprises, along with the sensations I am feeling, a countless variety of possibilities of sensation: namely, the whole of those which my past observation tells me that I could, under any supposable circumstances, experience at this moment, together with an indefinite and illimitable multitude of others which thought I do not know that I could, yet it is possible that I might, experience in circumstances not known to me. These various possibilities are the important thing to me in the world. My present sensations are generally of little importance, and are moreover fugitive: the possibilities, on the contrary, are permanent, which is the character that mainly distinguishes our idea of substance or matter from our notion of sensation.[53]

There is still, continues Mill, another important peculiarity of these certified or guaranteed possibilities of sensation, namely, that they have reference, not to single sensations, but to sensations joined together in groups. When we think of anything as a material substance, or body, we either have had, or we think that on some given supposition we should have, not some one sensation, but a great and even an indefinite number and variety of sensations, generally belonging to different senses, but so linked together that the presence of one announces the possible presence at the very same instant of any or all of the rest.[54]

Moreover, in addition to fixed groups, we also recognize a fixed order in our sensations; an order of succession, which, when ascertained by observation, gives rise to the ideas of cause and effect. Our ideas of causation, power, activity, do not become connected in thought with our sensations as actual at all, save in a few physiological cases. Those ideas become connected, not with sensations, but with groups of possibilities

[51] For a description of the laws of association see above.
[52] Examination, p. 221.
[53] Examination, pp. 222-223.
[54] Examination, p. 223.

of sensation. Hence we speedily learn to think of nature as made up solely of these groups of possibilities, and the active force in nature as manifested in the modification of some of these by others. The sensations, though the original foundation of the whole, come to be looked upon as a sort of accident depending on us, and the possibilities as much more real than the actual sensations, nay, as the very realities of which these are only the representations, appearances, or effects.[55]

When this state of mind has been arrived at, concludes Mill, then, and from that time forward, we are never conscious of a present sensation without instantaneously referring it to some one of the groups of possibilities into which a sensation of that particular description enters. The whole set of sensations as possible, form a permanent background to any or more of them that are, at a given moment, actual; and the possibilities are conceived as standing to the actual sensations in the relation of a cause to its effects. Their groundwork in sensation is forgotten, and they are supposed to be intrinsically distinct from it. We can withdraw ourselves from any of our (external) sensations, or we can be withdrawn from them by some other agency. But though the sensations cease, the possibilities remain in existence; they are independent of our will, our presence, and everything which belongs to us.[56]

We find, too, that they belong as much to other human or sentient beings as to ourselves.[57] We find other people grounding their expectations and conduct upon the same permanent possibilities on which we ground ours. But we do not find them experiencing the same actual sensations. Other people do not have our sensations exactly when and as we have them: but they have our possibilities of sensation; whatever indicates a present possibility of sensations to ourselves, indicates a present possibility of similar sensations to them. This puts

[55] Examination, pp. 224-225. [56] Examination, p. 225.

[57] One fails to see how Mill could, on his own chosen subjective grounds, conclude to the existence of other human beings. It is an unwarranted assumption. Concerning this and other contradictions found in his idealistic argument cf. Messer, *Einfuehrung in die Erkenntnislehre*, Leipzig, Duerr, pp. 61-70.

the final seal on our conception of the groups of possibilities as the fundamental reality in nature.[58]

Such, then, is, according to Mill, the origin and growth of our idea of matter, and our belief in external nature. If any one be not convinced by this argumentation, and retort with the famous Johnsonian *argumentum baculinum* of knocking a stick against the ground, or object that the idealist, like all mankind, really believes in matter, inasmuch as unless he did, he would not turn aside to save himself from running against a post, Mill will tranquilly assure him that the reliance of mankind on the real existence of visible and tangible objects, means reliance on the reality and permanence of possibilities of visible and tangible sensations, when no such sensations are actually experienced. On this belief, he says, all the practical consequences depend, and " if nobody believed in a material universe in any other sense, life would go on exactly as it does now." [59]

Mill designates this procedure expressly as the psychologic method. It consists in resolving consciousness into its constitutive elements and exhibiting knowledge as arising from the combination of these as ultimate data. His antithesis is " consciousness in its present artificial state," and " what is originally consciousness," and primitive consciousness as distinguished from present consciousness is the depository of its certainties. Thus Mill reverts to Berkeley's hypothesis of the sufficiency of mind, and explains matter as erroneously suggested by inseparable association of mental states.

Now it is well known that in psychology James is the opponent of the associationist principles which claim that our complex conscious states result from the fusion of mental elements (impressions), these latter being primordial, psychic atoms as it were, and the whole functioning like a sort of mental chemistry.[60] According to James the complete syntheses are primarily given, and only by comparative analysis do we later find their elements. Besides, over the determinist passive

[58] Examination, p. 226. [59] Examination, p. 282.

[60] Cf. Messer, *Empfindung und Denken*, Quelle & Meyer, Leipzig, 1908, p. 46.

discrete "impressions" of the associationists, the preponderance is given to the continuity of our mental states, and "acts" enter as teleological functions.[61] It will hence be interesting to examine how these different psychological views of Mill and James affect their handling of the problem of reality.

Mill, in treating this question, started from the subjective pole of the idea—reality chain, the individual with his beliefs, as the more concrete and immediately given phenomenon. He proceeded to seek how these truths are attained. James, warned as he tells us by the ways of critics, adopts different tactics.[63] He starts from the object-pole of the idea—reality chain, that is, he begins with the abstract notion of reality in itself. Having postulated this objective reality he asks, what makes any one's idea of it true for me as well as for him. He finds that however independent and "ejective" realities may be, we can know them only as so many objects-believed-in. To us the full nature of reality is given in the perceptual flux: reality's sense-experience and reality itself are for us identical.

Now, if realities in themselves can be for us only by being believed in, the question arises, how can we become assured of their trans-empirical existence and nature? James answers: If a man's idea leads him not only to believe that the reality is there, but to use it as the reality's temporary substitute, by letting it evoke adaptive thoughts and acts similar to those which the reality in itself would provoke, then it is true in the only intelligible sense, true through its particular consequences, true for that man.[63]

We have here the old pragmatic criterion. Reality exists, because its notion works satisfactorily: "Realities in themselves can be for any one only by being believed in; they are believed in only by their notions appearing true; and their notions appear true only because they work satisfactorily; satisfactorily, moreover, for the particular thinkers' purpose." [64]

[61] Psychology, Briefer Course, Macmillan & Co., London, ch. xi. The Stream of Consciousness.

[63] Meaning, p. 244. [63] Meaning, p. 244. [64] Meaning, p. 240.

One cannot fail to recognize the evident similarity which this argument bears to Mill's reply to the *argumentum baculinum*. With Mill a corollary, it becomes the central argument with James. Once more we have fundamental agreement: both philosophers assert that we can be sure of reality only as subjective sense experience.

However, one difference does exist. Mill has pronounced himself absolutely. For him reality is intrinsically subjective, the constitution of the world is metaphysically idealistic. James is less dogmatic. He affirms, indeed, that pragmatism can warrant [65] reality only as subjective sense experience; but, he adds, it does not prejudice anything as to reality's intrinsic constitution.[66] Maybe the trans-subjective is the truest of all beliefs.[67] Reality may exist distributively, just as it sensibly seems to, after all.[68]

Conclusion.

Looking back upon the result of our examination, we find an essential agreement between Mill and James regarding all the leading epistemological problems: both affirm the subordination of logic to psychology; both deny the existence of universals; both substitute dynamic relativity for static absolute truth; both limit our knowledge of reality to its sentient experience. Why, then, does the general physiognomy of Mill's positivism seem at first sight so different from the pragmatism of James? Perhaps the answer may be found in the following words of the latter: "If we take the whole history of philosophy, the systems reduce themselves to a few main types which, under all the technical verbiage in which the ingenious intellect of man envelops them, are just so many visions, modes of feeling the whole push, and seeing the whole drift of life, forced on one by one's total character and experience, and on the whole preferred as one's best working attitude." [69]

[65] Meaning, p. 213.
[66] Meaning, p. 215.
[67] Meaning, p. 243.
[68] A Pluralistic Universe, p. 328.
[69] A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 20-21.

Mill and James, though they agree in substance, because they are both thoroughgoing psychologists in their philosophy, differ, because they regard the same psychic phenomena from different centres of perspective. In Mill's "vision" of the stream of consciousness the law of association appears as the all-interpreter, whereas with James this role devolves on teleological evolution. Mill is a mechanical determinist, whereas James asks his criterions of truth precisely from the finalist characters of conscious life.

To resume, James followed Mill in applying psychology to the problem of knowledge, and in adopting his basic canon that the flux of conscious experience is epistemologically autonomous, admitting of no normative transcendental ideal laws. But he perceived that the formula which Mill had inductively abstracted from that flux was conceived too narrow for interpreting all the facts, and therefore he substituted his own biological conception to the law of association.

James may hence be justly said to move in Mill's orbit. As is well known, he himself gratefully acknowledges Mill as the "Father of English pragmatism" in dedicating his "Pragmatism" "to the memory of John Stuart Mill, from whom I first learned the pragmatic openness of mind, and whom my fancy likes to picture as our leader were he alive today." What Dewey said of James, is equally true of Mill: "His influence has made philosophy more hospitable to fact, more sensitive to the complex difficulties of situations, less complacently content with merely schismatic unities." [70] Saenger tells us that the philosophy of Mill is still exerting a living influence today, because Mill endeavored with iron consistency rather to have a method than a rounded in and closed system.[71] How often does not James reiterate that pragmatism is first and above all else a philosophic method?

There remains, however, the question how James arrived at applying biology to mental life. It is a matter of contempor-

[70] Cf. The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, Vol. VIII., No. 19, Sept. 15, 1910, p. 506.

[71] Samuel Saenger; John Stuart Mill, *Frommans Klassiker der Philosophie*, Stuttgart, Frommans Verlag, 1910, p. 68.

ary history how the scientific theory of evolution first promulgated by Darwin and Spencer, soon penetrated into the general intellectual atmosphere. No doubt, this was facilitated by the fact that criteriological problems dominate the preoccupation of the modern cultured world, as is attested by the singular phenomenon that many prominent philosophers of today started their career as scientists. Thus we owe Wundt to medicine, Ostwald to chemistry, Mach to physics, and Bergson to mathematics. Similarly James first held the chair of physiology at Harvard University. This would seem to account for the biological bent of mind which James manifests in his philosophy.

We have just said that sentiments akin to pragmatism were in the intellectual air. The fact that they were vaguely felt by many is proved by their almost synchronous independent crystallisations in the "Philosophie de l'Action" of Blondel, the "Evolution Créatrice" of Bergson, and the "Denkoekonomie" of Avenarius and Mach.

It will therefore be difficult to affirm any further definite doctrinal dependence of James. It is true, he acknowledges himself influenced by Charles Renouvier [72] and Henri Bergson.[73] As regards the latter, James may indeed have received confirmation in his own views from him, but it seems that at the period when he made the acquaintance of Bergson, his own philosophical personality had already been formed. Renouvier, the head of the neo-criticist school, is best known for his voluntarism in epistemology, that is, the important role he attributes to the free will in influencing our beliefs. It may be that the ideas which James developed chiefly in his "Will to Believe"[74] were to some extent influenced by the French master. We regret that we cannot here trace the possible connecting threads running between these two philosophers.

Casting a parting glance over all that has been said, it will

[72] Some Problems of Philosophy, Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1911, p. 165.

[73] A Pluralistic Universe, Lecture VI.

[74] The Will to Believe, Longmans, Green & Co., London, 1910.

not now be difficult to answer our initial question. Our examination, revealing the fundamental agreement of Mill and James, proves clearly the continuity existing between the two latest phases of English philosophy. At the same time it marks the evolution: the basic epistemological canon remains the same; but instead of its apodictic retrospective interpretation as found in the laws of association, new avenues of perspective are opened up by the teleological criterion introduced. While Mill in his solution of the problem of reality lies fixedly anchored at the antipodes of realism, James, indeed, also gravitates around the subjective pole; but the possibility is expressed that the oscillations of future experience may still some day bring pragmatism back to realism. The trans-subjective is again admitted as possibly a true belief.

If we represent by a curve the progressive effort of English philosophy to interpret experience, may we not then say that in Mill this curve reached the maximal negative distance from its realistic starting point? Already we have come back from must-be idealism to may-be realism. At any rate, the present writer, having followed from the shores of history the evolution of English philosophy since the days of Bacon, and seen each subsequent thinker driven farther toward the fathomless deep of subjective idealism, fancies he hears in the philosophy of William James the first faint song of the returning waves.

P. B. Vogt, O. F. M.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Origenes Werke, fünter Band, "De principiis:" herausgegeben, im Auftrage der Kirchenväter-Commission der Königl. Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, von Hofrat Prof. Dr. Paul Koetschau; in der Reihenfolge des Erscheinens der griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller, Band 22. J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, Leipzig, 1913.

Probably the works of no other patristic writer have been so much praised, misunderstood and condemned as those of Origen. Blessed with an unusual native genius and an almost superhuman capacity for work, Origen has established in tradition a reputation as an author which none will now deny. However much we may criticize the many extravagances that are said to have crept into his writings, we cannot fail to admire the genius and productivity of the man as a writer. That he should have produced such generally good literary results as he did under what has been called the Ambrosian high-pressure system, leads one to speculate as to what the great Alexandrian might have accomplished had he been able to command adequate leisure to temper his inspiration. It is the duty of the critic, however to determine not what Origen might have written under more favorable circumstances, but what he actually wrote. To one who is at all acquainted with the problems involved, the difficulty of such a task is obvious enough. The critic is not only handicapped by the palpable disappearance of data and by the usual difficulties attending the transmission of ancient texts, but finds himself at cross-fire between the interpretations of Origen's friends on one hand and those of his enemies on the other, when he tries to determine from the actual data at hand just what Origen thought and wrote.

The editor of the volume under review finds himself in just such a position. It is the object of his work to critically reconstruct the original text of Origen's most important theological treatise, *De Principiis;* or rather to establish a text on the basis of all available textual evidence, which will equivalently represent the text as it issued from the pen of Origen himself. That the author

has succeeded so well in the face of the difficulties in the way is a tribute to the scholarship and toil which the editor marshalled to his task. The original form of the text, like that of so many other works of Origen, has long since passed away and survives only in the form of translations more or less imperfect, citations and fragments. That this is the case is all the more to be regretted in view of the fact that *De Principiis* is held to contain what the reviser terms "die gewissen Grundanschauungen des Origens und vor allem die Verschmelzung des griechischen und christlichen Geistes, die damals in Alexandria vollzogen wurde." Almost from the beginning *De Principiis* was the object at which Origen's enemies levelled their deadliest shafts, and during the centuries that followed Origen's death, continued to be regarded as the evidence according to which the great Doctor's orthodoxy or heterodoxy was to be judged, and which eventually led to his condemnation as a heretic under Justinian.

The feature that particularly recommends the present volume is the fact that the editor not only publishes what he considers the best critical text available, but prefaces his rescension with an outline and discussion of the processes by which his reconstruction has been reached. After giving a brief summary of what is known with regard to the place of Origen, time of composition and object of Origen's work, together with a concatenation of references with regard to the manner in which the work was received by subsequent writers, the editor enters into a minute criticism of the sources whence he hopes to derive his material with which to effect his revision. The criticism circles around a comparative analysis of the "Grundschrift" of the present text, to wit, Rufinus' translation of the original Greek. The expert care with which the lacunae, interpolations and inaccurate translations in Rufinus' version are pointed out and listed cannot but arrest the attention of the reviewer, while the copious references and symbols, with which the revised text is equipped, makes it possible for the investigator to control the evidence adduced. The question might be raised, for instance, whether the reviser did not attribute a little too much importance to the extant extracts of St. Jerome's translation, when the latter stands in opposition to Rufinus' version. St. Jerome was no less Origen's enemy than Rufinus was his friend, and, while it is clear from the evidence that Rufinus in his translation did modify some of the extravagances contained in Origen's

original text, still it is not impossible that St. Jerome, despite his scholarship and good intentions, sinned a little by excess in the opposite direction. Just where the middle way between both positions is to be found is of course a matter to be determined, as far as possible, by collateral evidence. In the last analysis, however, it is largely a question of personal appreciation, and consequently there is ever a danger of mistaking subjective interpretation for a statement of objective fact. But since the editor has drawn up what he calls "eine Übersicht über die Fragmente der Hieronymus-Uebersetzung," and indicated when and to what extent these fragments disagree with the text of Rufinus, the individual "Forscher" is not entirely at the mercy of the reviser, but is put in a position to make the comparison himself. Consequently the volume in hand can be said to be, from many points of view, a real scholarly work, deserving of a place in the collection to which it has been recently added.

F. M. O'Reilly.

Eusebius Werke, Sechster Band, "Die Demonstratio Evangelica," herausgegeben, im Auftrage der Kirchenväter-Commission der Königl. Preussischen Akademie der Wissenchaften, von Dr. Ivan A. Heikel; in der Reihenfolge des Erscheinens der griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller, Band 23. J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, Leipzig, 1913.

The *Demonstratio Evangelica* is not classed among the most important works of early Christian literature, and yet, as the editor remarks, is deserving of more study and consideration than it has been the custom of scholars to give to it. Written in a highly oratorical and even affected style, and given to an extreme form of allegorical interpretation in matters scriptural, the *Demonstratio* never attracted much serious attention either in our own day or in the earlier centuries, and this, despite the fact that the *Demonstratio* contains numerous items of interest for both the Church historian and the positive theologian, no less than for the student of biblical exegesis. The work is essentially an apology of Christianity against the incursions of the Jews. Despite the pompous formality of the rhetoric employed, many illuminating side-lights are thrown on the historical situation and thought of the times, as, for instance, on the persecutions of the Christians by the Jews

and on the nature of the polemics indulged in by the followers of the law. And for the student of positive theology not a little information is supplied with regard to Eusebius' views concerning "de Deo uno et trino," the personality of Christ, and the part played by the Savior in the drama of history.

The object of the present volume, like that of the others in the series, is to establish a text which will represent as closely as possible the original thought and wording of its author. Unfortunately, however, the reviewer is seriously handicapped by the limitations of his sources and by the poverty of early texts. The earliest extant manuscript, the one which the editor is obliged to adopt as the basis of his rescension, *viz.*, the Codex Parisinus 469 (P), is a parchment manuscript that goes back no further than the twelfth century. This document as well as other extant manuscripts and fragments together with their respective glosses and interpolations, are described with considerable detail in the editor's introduction. All mistakes in punctuation and orthography found in the manuscripts are corrected in the revised text, all *lapsi calami* are remedied, and all words omitted by the scribe, or written by the corrector in the margin or between the lines, are put in their proper juxtaposition. A few examples of such corrections are given in the "Einleitung," but the editor did not deem it necessary or useful to draw the reader's attention every time he saw fit to make such a change. While it is true that such a procedure, especially with regard to the corrections made in punctuation and orthography, has a distinct advantage in that the text is not overburdened with too many useless signs and references, still in those instances in which marginal or interlinear words and phrases have been incorporated into the text, and especially when the retention or rejection of these corrections would materially affect the doctrinal significance of the passages in question, it would have been better, had the reviser drawn the attention of the critic to the changes he felt justified in making. At all events, if scholarly effort on the part of the editor affords us any ground for forming a judgment, we are justified in entertaining of him the hope which he himself expresses with regard to his central source, to wit: "Conjekturen oder andere willkürliche Verbesserungen hat er nicht gemacht."

F. M. O'Reilly.

Eusebius Werke, Siebenter Band, "Die Chronik des Hieronymus," herausgegeben im Auftrage derselben oben gewähnten Kirchenväter-Commission, von Dr. Rudolf Helm in der Reihenfolge des Erscheinens der griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller, Band 24. J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, Leipzig, 1913.

The seventh volume "der Eusebius Werke" contains a portion of a work which has contributed largely towards establishing Eusebius' reputation as the Christian Herodotus and the Father of Ecclesiastical History. In the "Chronography," or first part of the work, as Eusebius himself tells us in his preface, the great Doctor of Caesarea gives in summary a history of all peoples as he compiled it from the Scriptures and from the ancient historians Berose, Manethon, Phlegon and others; and in the "Kanon Chronikos" or second part, he gives a chronological list of events that afford a birdseye view of universal history as known in his time. The fate of this all-important masterpiece has not been unlike that of so many other early writings. Of the original Greek only a few fragments have been preserved. We are largely dependent on an Armenian version for our knowledge of the first part of the work, and on St. Jerome's Latin translation for our knowledge of the second half. As might be antecedently expected it is the object of the editor of the volume under review to present the best possible critical text. In carrying out his plan in the present volume, he makes the task of the reviewer either extremely laborious or extremely simple, according as the latter interprets his function as reviewer. Apart from a register of proper names found at the end of the volume and a list of the manuscripts employed in the recension, together with a notice that variations, found in the various manuscripts with regard to the year of the events chronicled, are indicated in the inner margin of the text, and that the scribes themselves were ofttimes doubtful as to the accurate historical delineations, the editor submits nothing to review other than his reconstructed text. 'Tis true, the latter enjoys the distinction of having been published in quasi-manuscript form; and the scholarship of the reviser renders it fair to presume that the rescension has been effected only by the scrupulous application of critical methods. But unless the reviewer wishes to turn reviser himself and go through the process of collation step by step, he can not

at present writing suggest any personal criticism as to the merits of the volume under review other than to regret the failure of the editor to take his readers into his confidence and to discuss with them the problems involved in his work of rescension and the processes by means of which he arrived at his solution. Perhaps he will do this in the second volume which we are led to believe is now on its way towards completion.

F. M. O'Reilly.

L'Eucharistie: La Presence Réelle et La Transsubstantiation. Par Mgr. Batiffol. Cinquiéme Edition refondue et corrigée. 1913, J. Gabalda, Paris, Rue Bonaparte, 90.

This fifth edition of Mgr. Batiffol's work on the Eucharist comes to us "recast and corrected" and bearing the Imprimatur of the Vicar-General of Paris. The first and second editions were published in 1905; the third appeared in April, 1906 and was exhausted in September, 1907. In the meantime critics were busy, the book was attacked, the "Lamentabili" was published in July, 1907, and the letter against Modernism in September, 1907. The Holy See was active against all writings savoring of error or of yielding too much to a certain historico-critical spirit which seemed to be spreading amongst Catholic writers, with an apparent diminution of respect for tradition and the *depositum fidei*. The fourth edition, drawn in fifty copies for the use of revisors only, was not given to the public. The author was not discouraged: he humbly accepted suggestions made by Roman theologians, and in the fifth edition we have a very interesting study of the Real Presence and of Transsubstantiation from the pen of one well versed in the history of the Eucharistic doctrine and firm in the faith of the Church.

Every student should be anxious to know what can be learned about the Eucharist from the earliest sources available. From these sources outsiders have drawn false conclusions, and it is against such writers in general and Jean Réville in particular (*Les Origines de l'Eucharistie*, Paris, 1908), that Mgr. Batiffol writes. Such discussions necessarily deal with the knotty problem of the development or growth of Catholic doctrine. In the earlier editions of his work the author did not distinguish with sufficient

clearness between faith in Transsubstantiation and the more apt and accurate expression of that doctrine. The faith of the church cannot change: the manner of knowing and expressing that faith may and does change. The doctrine of Transsubstantiation was always accepted in the church, although the early believers spoke and wrote of it under the name of " change " or " conversion " of bread into the body of Christ and of wine into His blood. It was in relation to the explicitness of belief in Transsubstantiation in the early Church that critics found fault with former editions of Mgr. Batiffol's work, which in its present form is acceptable to the learned Roman theologians whom the author consulted (see the *Epilogue*).

The Eucharistic doctrine is outlined in three parts of the work: The first deals with the original sources, giving the testimonies of the Evangelists, St. Paul, St. Justin, Hermas, St. Ignatius and St. Clement; the second treats of the period from St. Irenaeus to Eusebius; the third of the period from Eusebius to the Council of Ephesus (431). At the end of each period the author gives a summary of the conclusions to be drawn from the documents cited. Fidelity to tradition and the Church guided by the Holy Spirit must be the final rule and test of Christian dogma, but there is much comfort in finding our faith confirmed by documents coming down from the days of the Apostles and the first centuries of the Christian era. Whilst the study of such documents nowadays is necessary for the defense of our Christian heritage, Mgr. Batiffol's trials show that the investigations must be made with great care and in the spirit of faith and humble submission to the authority of the Church, such as he has laudably manifested.

D. J. Kennedy, O. P.

Eucharist and Penance, in the First Six Centuries of the Church, by Gerhard Rauschen: Authorized translation from the second German Edition. 1913, B. Herder, St. Louis, Mo.

This is a volume of positive theology dealing with the history of the Eucharist and Penance during the first six centuries of the Church. The first edition, published in 1908, was translated into Italian by G. Bonaccorsi (*L'Eucaristia e la Penitenza,* Firenze,

1909), and into French by M. Decker and E. Ricard (*L'Eucharistie et la Pénitence,* Paris, 1910), which goes to show that the work at once attracted the attention of scholars.

The French translators, whilst praising the scope of the work and adopting its conclusions in general, made some reservations on special points and arguments. Friendly and scholarly criticisms were diligently considered by the author, and the result is this second edition thoroughly revised and improved, a notable feature being the added chapter on *The frequency of, and dispositions for, Communion in the early Church.* The volume now presented in English bears the Imprimatur of the distinguished Archbishop of St. Louis. The importance of this historical study is evident from the list of subjects treated, *viz.,* on the Eucharist: The Real Presence: Transsubstantiation: The Institution of the Eucharist: The Nature of the Sacrifice of the Mass: The Canon of the Mass: The Epiclesis: Frequent Communion in the Early Church. On the Sacrament of Penance we find the following chapters: Ecclesiastical Absolution from Capital sins in the first three centuries: Public Confession: Public Penance: Auricular Confession. The book, written by a distinguished professor in the University of Bonn, is dogmatic, historical, critical and controversial.

Dr. Rauschen unhesitatingly rejects not only Protestant theories but also the interpretations of Catholic writers when they seem to yield too much to dissenters, and he is careful always to give reasons for the interpretation which he adopts. In particular he rejects several opinions advanced by Mgr. Batiffol in the first editions of his treatise on the Eucharist (see present number of the *Catholic University Bulletin*). Much value is added to the work by the alphabetical index giving the names of authors cited in the book, whether their opinions were admitted or rejected. The spirit and the result of the study are expressed best in the author's own words in the end of the chapter on Auricular Confession. "Whoever glances over what has been said in the foregoing pages must admit that, no matter how the present-day discipline may differ in appearance from that of the early days, there can be no question of any substantial modification of innovation on the part of the Church in the administration of the sacrament of penance" (Retrospect, p. 250).

Our author evidently had in mind the same rule regarding the development of doctrine as that announced by Albertus Magnus,

who wrote that whatever development or growth there may be is "potius profectus fidelis in fide quam fidei in fideli" (3, dist. 25, Art. 1. Cfr. St. Thom., 2a 2ae, Qu. 1, A. 7, C., ad 2 ad 4).

D. J. KENNEDY, O. P.

The Divine Twilight, by Rev. Cornelius Holland, S. T. L. Catholic Texts Society, Providence, R. I.

In this little book Father Holland has admirably arranged for children the interesting stories of the Old Testament, and has told them in the inspired language of Holy Scripture itself. As Monsignor Shahan tells us in the Preface, "it is a beautiful story, this story of God's dealings with the world, and children will read it with great pleasure and profit, not only once but many times." They will find an added charm in the skillful manner in which the author has caused one story to follow the other. The illustrations are well chosen, but we regret that they are so small. The size of the book and the typography are all that can be desired.

Philosophia Naturalis. By J. De La Vaissiére, S. J. In two volumes. Paris, Beauchesne, 1912.

The principles of philosophy do not change; but their application must be presented in accordance with the established facts of science. This seems to have been the watch-word of De La Vaissiére in his *Philosophia Naturalis* which forms two volumes of the series of the text-books on philosophy brought out by the Jesuits of Jersey College. The work comprises Cosmology and General Psychology divided into six books which treat respectively of the inorganic nature, of vegetative life, of sensitive life, of intellectual life, of man as a composite being, and of the universe. Some principles of General Metaphysics also are discussed, not consecutively, but whenever they are applied; *e. g.*, space, motion, time, and quantity are treated in the first book. The facts and the laws of the positive sciences are treated with more importance and at greater length than is usual in text-books on philosophy. Thus, for example, the first book devotes a chapter to the laws of mathe-

matics, another to the laws of geometry, another to the laws of kinematics, besides referring to facts and theories of these sciences in substantiating philosophical propositions. Disputed facts of science and opposing views of philosophers are presented in the "Annotationes."

Another desirable feature is the introduction of current philosophical thought. The theories of James, Bergson, Ribot, Eucken, and others are reviewed in the relative "status opinionum." The opposing opinions are well classified when necessary, and the points of difference of agreement between modern and scholastic thought are well brought out.

The text-book has many qualities to recommend it, especially for students who are conversant with the French language. Foremost of these is its attention to the positive sciences. For, as the author remarks, without at least an elementary scientific knowledge many propositions of philosophy cannot be demonstrated; others cannot be successfully defended against modern objections; moreover, philosophy should be a higher unification of all true scientific knowledge.

O. F. KNAPKE.

The Dominican Order and Convocation. By Ernest Barker. Oxford University Press, New York.

The purpose of this modest, but pleasing little volume is to give some explanation, through a brief study of the Dominican Order and the English Convocation, of the development and practice of representative government which characterizes the institutional side of the thirteenth century Church.

It is strikingly observable that never before was the principle of representation so much in vogue as in the thirteenth century. The three great Councils held during the century, the two at Lyons and the fourth Lateran, have representatives in them; representation becomes a special feature of provincial synods and is a marked characteristic of the great Orders of Friars—the Dominicans and Franciscans—which have their birth at the opening of the century. It is also remarkable, and certainly more than a mere coincidence, that the same period sees representation a growing tendency of the state, in England and France especially.

What is the source of this new system of government? Whence does it come? Is the Church or the state responsible for it?

It could hardly be said with truth that representation was primarily and independently a conception of the state, even though it did appear in Spain toward the end of the twelfth century. Much more in accord with the facts it is to say, as does the present author, that the institutional development, so marked in the thirteenth century, was not a result of the action of either Church or state alone, but rather an effect of the growing policy of both. They develop side by side, and interact in their progress. However, if we note carefully the advancement of the two, the conclusion seems obvious that the Church, in England especially, and to a great extent throughout Europe, by its method of organization, its ideas, and manner of procedure, was a model for the regular parliamentary system which afterwards developed in the state.

Now the Order founded by St. Dominic at the beginning of the thirteenth century, was representative in the highest degree. Very early in the century, (1221) it is able to show the most finished model of representative government then existing. The Franciscans copy from the Dominicans their system of organization. Both are new and powerful Orders and exercise an unusual influence on the state as well as on the Church. Thus Mr. Barker sees in the statesmanship of St. Dominic, and in the perfection of the organization founded by him, a probable and a partial explanation of the representative mode of government characteristic of the thirteenth century in Church and state alike.

CHAS. J. CALLAN.

Dictionnaire apologetique de la Foi Catholique, sous la direction de A. d'Alès. Fascicule ix. Paris, Beauchesne, 1913.

Subscribers to the new French Apologetic Dictionary look forward with undiminished interest to the appearance of each succeeding number, and thus far even the fastidious critic need not feel disappointed. Few of the subjects treated are not of interest for the Catholic reader in America, and the careful scholarship which they display amply repays the cost of subscription.

In the present number, the Abbé Besson finishes his article on cremation in which the attitude of the Church towards this method

of disposing of the dead is shown to rest on weighty grounds of social utility as well as of religion. Under the title, Religions of India, are included two scholarly contributions, one by the Abbé Roussel consisting of an historical description of Brahmanism, Buddhism and Hinduism, the other, by Professor de la Vallée Poussin, dealing with the problems of the origin and growth of the Hindu religion, of its comparative worth when viewed side by side with Christianity, and of the alleged infiltrations into Christianity of Buddhist and Hindu ideas and legends. No less than twenty-eight pages are devoted to this double study.

Professor Forget gives in seven pages an historical and apologetical account of the Index for the condemnation of books hurtful to faith and morals. Father Galtier, S. J., devotes nearly seventeen pages to the subject of indulgences, treating with ability their dogmatic basis, the different forms they assumed in the course of time, the abuses that crept in and the reforms adopted for their correction. Two difficult questions are carefully handled by Father Durand, S. J., one on biblical inerrancy, the other on biblical inspiration. The treatise on baptism by the Abbé d'Alès, covering seventeen pages, is admirable for its range of information and orderly perspective. Perhaps the most interesting contribution is that of J. Guiraud on the Inquisition. Thirty-four pages are given to this important question, in which the reader cannot but admire the judicious temper as well as the great erudition of the author. His list of sources and references at the end is surprisingly full, taking up three pages.

All who are interested in Catholic pedagogy will hail with delight the important study on ecclesiastical education of the young, of which only part is contained in the present fascicule. It is the joint production of several scholars. Gaston Sortais gives the first contribution, setting forth the rights and duties of the principal agents of education, the family, the Church and the State. The second contribution, by Paul Allard, is an historical survey of Christian teaching in the Roman Empire. The third, by the Abbé Clerval, is a continuation of the history of Catholic teaching during the Middle Ages. In the fourth, F. Sagot describes the educative work of the Church in the periods of the Renaissance and Reformation. Only part of this contribution is given. The rest, together with three others, treating of education in France, will be printed in the next number.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

The Morning Watch. The Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius, proposed by F. Ignatius Dierkins, S. J. Translation edited by F. Elder Mullan, S. J. New York: Kennedy and Sons, 1913. Price $1.50.

Father Ignatius Dierkins, who was born in Bruxelles in the year 1626 and died in Rome as assistant of the Superior General in the year 1700 is the author of the Explanations of the Spiritual Exercises, a famous work which, first published in the year 1687, has been many times reprinted. The third appendix to this work was published later in the year 1689 and contains the meditations of the Spiritual Exercises with only such development as were considered necessary. It is this last Appendix which Father Elder Mullan presents now for the first time translated into English and adapted to easy practical use.

There is certainly no need of saying anything in praise of St. Ignatius' Spiritual Exercises, a book that has been praised by so many popes, prelates, priests and laymen, a book that is said to have done more good to souls than any other book, with exception, of course, of the Holy Writ. The English edition by Father Elder Mullan is splendid in all its simplicity and most practical. He faithfully avoids all unnecessary changes and additions and makes St. Ignatius speak in his earnest yet amiable way immediately to the reader. There is no doubt that this English edition attains its aim and, as Father Elder Mullan modestly puts it, affords aspirants after the higher life, especially priests, seminarians, religious and sodalists of our Lady, a help to put before themselves in their daily meditations, thoughts which will urge them on and up in God's holy ways. The external appearance of the edition is dignified and the price moderate.

F. COELN.

Archbishop Smith and the Mosaic Authorship of the Pentateuch. Compiled by S. T. B. With a memory of the Archbishop. Aberdeen, The University Press.

The anonymous author hidden under the initials of Sacrae Theologiae Baccalaureus adds to his book two appendices. The first appendix gives the English translation of the *Motu proprio* of His

Holiness Pope Pius X (Nov. 18, 1907) on the Pontifical Commission and also the decisions of that Commission to May 1st, 1910. The second appendix contains a list of Scriptural articles found in the *Dublin Review* (May, 1836--July, 1910), and *Irish Theological Quarterly* (1906-1911). Both appendices, no doubt, are of benefit to theological students. They would be of still greater benefit if the author—and this may be a modest suggestion for a possible second edition—agreed to change the first appendix into a comprehensive collection of all ecclesiastical documents having bearing on Holy Writ and to extend his research for scriptural articles to as many more reviews as possible. The danger of making the book too bulky might be avoided by omitting the treatises I-IV, which could be done easily without any serious damage. The book when shaped as just suggested will then deserve to be recommended to all that take an interest in biblical matters.

F. Coeln.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

Feast of the Conversion of St. Paul. The Feast of the Conversion of St. Paul, the Patronal Feast of the Faculty of Theology, was celebrated on Sunday, January 25, by a High Mass in the Chapel of Gibbons Hall. The sermon was preached by Very Reverend Daniel J. Kennedy, O. P.

Mid-Year Examination. The Mid-Year examination began Friday, January 30, and continued during the week February on 2 to February 7.

Shahan Debating Society. The last of the preliminary debates of the Society was held on Thursday, January 8. These debates lead up to the Prize Contest, the date of which has not yet been announced.

Gibbons Hall. A new spacious recreation hall has been fitted up for the use of students. It has already proved a benefit to the students' societies, and especially to the Glee Club.